Hi, For some reason I don't receive any of Chris' posts. Thanks to Forest for forwarding this to me.
Chris wrote: >>This is the definition of MAMPO: >> >>1. A candidate's opposition score is equal to the greatest number of >>votes against him in any pairwise contest. >>2. The voter ranks; those ranked are also "approved." >>3. If more than one candidate is approved by a majority, elect the one >>of these with the lowest opposition score. >>4. Otherwise elect the most approved candidate. >> >>MAMPO satisfies FBC, SDSC, and SFC like MDDA does. But MAMPO also >>satisfies Woodall's Plurality criterion. > >Kevin, >I'm interested in your opinion of my stab at something similar that >meets Irrelevant Ballots: > >"1 and 2 as for MAMPO. >3. Give each candidate a score that is equal to its approval score minus >its opposition score. >4. Elect the candidate with the highest score". Sadly I don't see that this method can satisfy MF. Take an election like this: 49 A 51 B>A B has a score of (51-49)=2, while A has a score of (100-51)=49. I believe this satisfies FBC, but few if any of MAMPO's other properties. Kevin Venzke ___________________________________________________________________________ Découvrez une nouvelle façon d'obtenir des réponses à toutes vos questions ! Profitez des connaissances, des opinions et des expériences des internautes sur Yahoo! Questions/Réponses http://fr.answers.yahoo.com ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info