Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Chris: > [Approval] is very vulnerable to disinformation campaigns Mike: > That’s a vague statement that could be said of many methods, including > some that Chris likes. Chris: > My statement lacked details, but that doesn't make it "vague". I've > elaborated this criticism of Approval > a few times before. > > Say in the lead-up to the election two candidates have announced that > they will run, and accurate polling > of voters' voting intentions shows A52%, B48%. Say the media hate A, > so others that hate A nominate > a third candidate C who is anathema to A's supporters (or at least > some of them). Then those that hate A > set about giving C a high profile and publishing some fake polls that > suggest that C has some chance to > win. This frightens some of the A supporters into approving B, causing > A to win. Mike: > That’s routine in this country. Chris: > 47: A > 05: AB (disinformed timid A>B>>>C preferrers) > 46: B > 02: CB > > Approval: B53, A52, C2. Mike: > Quite so. That’s why I say that, though for me, as an individual > voter, Approval would be fine, millions of voters need a method that > doesn’t require any good judgment from them--a good rank method. > > As it actually happens, virtually all of the A voters vote for B, and > so it’s easy for the media to convince voters that A isn’t “viable” > and isn’t “a serious candidate”. The election results seem to confirm > what the A supports have been told by their tv. I of course agree that plurality is also vulnerable to disinformation, but in a way Approval is worse. In my example, the five AB compromisers might correctly believe that A has at least as good a chance of winning as B and that C has the least chance to win. They don't need to be convinced that their favourite isn't viable, just (given their abhorrence of C) that C has some 'significant' chance of winning. In this scenario if the method was FPP they would have voted for their sincere favourite A. And likewise if it was IRV they would have voted sincerely A>B. Chris Benham > > ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info