Tim Hull wrote: > That's the answer to what would likely happen if Range voting were > implemented anywhere of significance - cards like those used in Australia > would appear telling voters how to vote. Granted, it would probably happen > under any preferential system, but in range it is almost guaranteed that > bullet voting would be encouraged "except" by minor party candidates, which > MAY recommend voting for major party candidates as well. > > Though I like the basic idea of range, I will say I have reconsidered > somewhat when it comes to contentious elections. In this case, I do see it > degenerating into Approval really fast. While Approval is a decent system > (better than FPTP for sure), third parties would still have significant > trouble breaking through (major parties will always bullet vote, and a > large > number of third-party supporters will vote for the major party as well). We > may see "shifts" between one party being major and another being major from > election to election as voting results start to demonstrate shifts in > support and voters vote accordingly, but it seems like each election will > continue to be a basically two-party competition in and of itself. > > In my mind, that leaves IRV and Condorcet as serious voting reform > proposals. While IRV isn't the best thing in the world (it can screw up > when a new party becomes "major" in an election), it could help third > parties with a solid coalition with a major party (i.e. nearly all > Democrats
you might want to reconsider your position on IRV as shown here: http://zesty.ca/voting/sim/ it produces can produce some very dysfunctional results, and in some 4 party cases produces results that would be considered worse then plurality. > vote Green #2, and all Greens vote Democrat #2). It does suffer from the > "center squeeze", though. Condorcet, on the other hand, does not suffer > from the center squeeze. However, it suffers from the opposite problem - > the so-called "Pro Wrestler" or "Loony" syndrome in an election with a > couple polarized candidates and a weak centrist or joke candidate. In my > student government elections, I picture this being a candidate walking > around campus in a clown suit and winning based on becoming everybody's #2. > Also, Condorcet's later-no-harm failure may mean people give a less sincere > ranking than in IRV, though this failure is far less so than in range. This is a potential problem with all pure Condorcet methods. It might be able to be overcome with some restrictions Candidate must have >5% first preference votes or be one of the top 5 candidates in number of first preference votes. Or some other restriction might help. > However, PR still seems like the primary thing to shoot for - single winner > elections really aren't any good in achieving better representation. For > that reason, I can see the logic of those pushing IRV with the intent of > moving in a PR direction. I will say that, given honest voters and an > absence of "Loony" type candidates, Condorcet produces better results and > seems better. However, it is more complex - and is yet another system to > discuss. I really think that STV should be the real goal, with IRV used in > single-winner elections (when necessary) for consistency - party lists are > rotten by comparison, and no other system has been tested and proven for > multiwinner to the extent of STV. I agree STV is a very good system, but a lot depends on the DM, I would suggest 5-9 is a good DM. closer to the 5 side if you expect lots of candidates closer to the 9 side if you expect fewer. While I agree party lists are "rotten". there are lots of other multi winner PR systems, that don't require a party list MMP where the "top-up" comes from the best of the losers. > > Thus, I plan on moving in an IRV+STV direction as far as my reforms (with > multiwinner STV used for 70% of the seats on my student government i.e. all > of the multi-seat districts). > > Tim > On 4/25/07, Howard Swerdfeger <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> >> >> >> Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: >> > At 06:41 PM 4/24/2007, Juho wrote: >> >>> If you vote Approval style, you fail to express your true >> >>> appreciation of the candidates, and this can backfire. >> >> Yes, but typically/statistically Approval strategy improves the >> outcome. >> > >> > No. Check out Warren's simulations. Sincere voting (which means >> > expressing weak preferences as weak votes) produces the best >> > outcomes. Approval style produces acceptable outcomes, relative to >> > some other methods. >> >> You are making assumptions about what is "best". >> >> On a side note: I still have not found the definition of the Individual >> Utility Function used in the simulations talked about at 'rangevoting.org >> '. >> I am willing to accept there Society Utility function as the Sum of >> Individual Utilities. Did they use U(v, c) = 1/R? Or did they use >> something else? how does the choice of the Utility function affect the >> simulation results. >> >> >> >>> I say that we are not going to really know until we see real >> >>> elections using Range. The alleged devolution to Approval is not a >> >>> serious harm. It would only mean that some ballot space and a >> >>> counting effort had been wasted. >> >> Yes, Range could be roughly as good as Approval (with some wasted >> >> effort, and ability to cast weak votes). The biggest hiccups might >> >> come in the form of people realizing that their vote was weak >> >> although they didn't understand that when they voted, or if some >> >> candidate won as a result of efficient use of strategic voting. >> > >> > That actually doesn't happen easily under Range (the latter). >> > Basically, the most "efficient" strategy for winning is to get as >> > many of your supporters as possible to bullet-vote for you. However, >> > this can backfire, if you offend those who might otherwise like you >> > but consider your recommendation that you vote against your favorite >> > to be quite offensive. I know it would offend me! >> >> Then how do you explain Voting cards! >> http://www.australianpolitics.com/images/qld/2001-htv-cook.jpg >> They are the an emergence of candidates telling voters how to vote. >> >> > >> > Can you imagine how it would look of a candidate steps in front of >> > the cameras and says: "Don't vote sincerely, it might cause me to >> > lose. Vote only for me!" >> > >> > Political suicide, that's what it would be, if the election were >> > Range. Instead, candidates, as now, will simply try to convince >> > voters that they are the best, and it is possible, but not certain, >> > that they will refrain, a little more, from trying to tear down their >> > opponents, for fear of alienating their supporters and thus losing >> those >> votes. >> > >> >>>> Rating the least preferred candidate at 0 reduces the probability of >> >>>> that candidate getting elected (and doesn't carry any risks with >> it). >> >>> But from the conditions of the problem, there was no risk of that. >> >>> No, I don't buy it. (By the way, none of us involved with Range >> >>> would recommend giving the "least preferred candidate" any other >> >>> vote than the minimum. I assumed that PW was being given a 1 >> >>> because voters somewhat liked him, there were *worse* candidates >> >>> involved. >> >> There were no worse candidates involved. The voter liked PW somewhat. >> >> But since PW was the least liked candidate and the voter wanted to >> >> avoid electing him, giving him 0 was a perfect solution. (I thus used >> >> sincere utility based ratings instead of normalized ones.) >> > >> > And this is correct voting! Basically, the supposed "sincere" votes >> > from which the method devolved into Approval were ignorant votes. I'd >> > really suggest that ballot instructions be explicit, suggesting that >> > you vote the max for your favorite, the min for your least preferred, >> > and whatever you want for the rest.... Range votes are *relative* >> > votes. If there were a dozen candidates, and all were quite well >> > qualified, we still need to pick one and we will want to pick the >> > best. To get good information from the voters, we need them to >> > normalize their votes. Otherwise, the necessary resolution is lost. >> > If on some absolute scale, all the candidates are 10s, on what basis >> > would we choose between them? >> > >> > No, Range is about *relative* utility. But I prefer to think of voter >> > satisfaction. It is about rating candidates as to how satisfied you >> > will be if they are elected, with max rating meaning maximally >> > satisfied, and min rating meaning maximally dissatisfied. Relatively >> > speaking. You might actually be satisfied in an absolute sense with >> > any of them, or with none of them. >> > >> >>> But this contradicts the assumed initial sincere vote! If you want >> >>> this, why would you vote A=9, B=8 in the first place? By voting >> >>> this way, you are saying that B winning is almost as satisfactory >> >>> to you as A winning! >> >> The voter voted originally sincerely since voters were given the >> >> impression that they should write one's sincere preferences on the >> >> ballot. >> > >> > The ballot instructions were, "Write your sincere preferences on the >> ballot"? >> > >> > When you vote a ranked ballot, and some systems require full ranking, >> > you are putting one candidate at the top and one at the bottom. Some >> > allow you to put more than one in each of these positions, or in >> > intermediate positions. The method essentially normalizes your vote, >> > making it equivalent to a range of 0% to 100% in Range. But ranked >> > methods don't consider preferences strength, though some impute it, >> > in a way, by considering "defeat strength." >> > >> >> Candidate B winning would be quite satisfactory to this >> >> voter. The voter however wants to make A the winner if he can choose >> >> between A and B. If A and B were the only candidates, voting A=max, >> >> B=min would be also risk free. >> >> >> >>> I think that people can and will understand that democracy is often >> >>> about making compromises. It is *not* about crushing the opposition! >> >> I agree, but competitiveness exists despite of this, and that may >> >> lead to voting with maximum power etc. >> > >> > Range limits "maximum power" to one vote per voter. And we recommend >> > and generally assume that all voters, with rare exceptions, will vote >> > with maximum power. That is, they will rank one max and one min and >> > they will array the others as they choose. This is maximum power. It >> > won't "lead" to this condition, this *is* Range. >> > >> > >> >>> "Vote -1 to vote against a candidate, vote +1 to vote for the >> >>> candidate, and vote zero or leave a candidate unrated to have an >> >>> intermediate effect. The candidate with the greatest sum of votes >> >>> will win." >> >> Note that negative votes carry some risks. >> > >> > The issue here is where the default vote is for abstentions. The >> > standard in original Range proposals was that it was zero, >> > effectively. Average vote disregards abstentions, which is its own >> > problem and requires a "quorum rule" to avoid obvious bad outcomes. >> > Using negative votes is a means of making the default be other than >> > zero, that's all. The range I suggested makes the default be midrange. >> > >> > >> >> Let's say there are three >> >> major parties with one candidate each, and many totally unknown >> >> candidates. All major parties are afraid of each others and will give >> >> lots of negative votes to both competing party candidates. The sum of >> >> all major party candidates may go below 0. >> > >> > This situation is a setup for a bad outcome. Be careful not to blame >> > the voting method for the total disarray and disunity of the >> > electorate! Given the setup, it is not clear that there is *any* good >> outcome! >> > >> >> Some unknown candidate is >> >> mentioned only in very few ballots (let's say his/her family members >> >> supporting and one neighbour opposing). His score will however be >> >> positive and he will be elected, not the well known candidates whose >> >> score was negative. >> > >> > That's correct. But something was totally neglected in this analysis. >> > That candidate is only going to have a couple of votes above zero. >> > But the conditions were that there were *many* candidates. Surely >> > there is at least one of them who is well-enough known and >> > well-enough liked that the candidate gets more than a couple of votes! >> > >> > Really, if it is true that there are more people in a society opposed >> > to a candidate than favor him or her, do you think the candidate >> > should be elected! There is a simple solution to the problem given, >> > which is a ratification step or runoff. (Not a top-two runoff, but a >> > runoff between, say, the votes analyzed as sum and the votes analyzed >> > as raw, abstentions zero.) >> > >> > The problem, if it is a problem -- I'm not sure it is -- could be >> > addressed by setting the default lower: >> > >> > -1: Disliked >> > 0: Acceptable >> > 1: Good >> > 2: Preferred. >> > >> > Or, alternatively, the simpler Range 3 implementation with blank >> > votes defined as -1/2 vote. Or perhaps even some smaller negative >> > value, like -1/10. Something to reflect the value that the winner, >> > preferably, should be well enough known that the candidate is rated >> > by most voters. >> > >> > This is a question regarding how to treat blank votes. It's an >> > unresolved issue among Range advocates. >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> >>> [I suggested that there be a runoff between the Range winner and a >> >>> Condorcet winner, if they differ] >> >>>> Let's assume that a Condorcet winner exists. In this case this >> method >> >>>> could be said to be a method where the voters are given a second >> >>>> chance to think again if the Range winner could be seen as a "good >> >>>> compromise" even though the majority could easily vote as in the >> >>>> first round and elect the Condorcet winner. >> >>> Yes. That is, the original ballot analysis showed that this C. >> >>> winner was rated higher than the Range winner on a majority of >> >>> ballots. >> >>> >> >>>> I'm not sure this method >> >>>> would be a very practical method in real life large elections but in >> >>>> principle the idea of "recommending" the Range winner to the voters >> >>>> is a positive idea. Some strategies where people would try to >> >>>> influence who the Range winner will be could take place (i.e. the >> >>>> Range winner of the second round would not be the sincere range >> >>>> winner). >> >>> I think Juho means that the Range winner of the *first* round would >> >>> not be the sincere Range winner. If there is a second round, it is >> >>> not held as a Range election. It is a straight which-of-these-two- >> >>> shall-be-elected vote. Voters will know, this time, if the first >> >>> election was sincere, which candidate will be most broadly >> >>> acceptable. Which is more important to them, for their preference >> >>> to win or for the most broadly acceptable candidate to win? >> >>> Majority rule. >> >>> >> >>> I'd suggest that if their preference was weak, the majority might >> >>> prefer the Range winner, on reflection. But if their preference was >> >>> strong, they might insist upon it. >> >> If the first round votes were sincere the Condorcet winner will be >> >> preferred over the Range winner by majority (since the definition of >> >> Condorcet winner says so). The Range winner would however be better >> >> if measured as sum of satisfaction of the voters (if that is what the >> >> voters marked in the ballots). The opinions could however change >> >> before the second round as a result of publishing the fact that there >> >> was a Range winner that was different from the Condorcet winner, and >> >> the range winner could be supported by a majority at the second round >> >> (depends on the level of competitiveness etc.). >> >> >> >> Juho >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ___________________________________________________________ >> >> The all-new Yahoo! 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