(To repeat what I wrote in my last post:) Kathy Dopp wrote me off list with a helpful suggestion, but I responded as if she had posted to the list. I expect that she will not mind if I also post my responses here, since I'm seeking broader comment.
At 11:41 PM 5/9/2007, Kathy Dopp wrote: >Bruce O'Dell has posted several informed discussion of the drawbacks >of the voting system you favor. Contact him or google for his >postings - although I'm not sure if his postings have only been via >email. He's with Election Defense Alliance. I looked and found material about Mr. O'Dell, but nothing on the point of making ballot images public. There is some material about so-called "ballot images" that are really images produced by voting machines from machine votes, they are not ballots. I'm talking about paper ballots, which are either marked manually by voters or, either for all or for some, they are printed by a computer printer according to form entry on the computer. This, by the way, could also use ubiquitous technology and, as a plus, if vote-buying were considered a problem, it could be required that all ballots be produced in that way. In any case, what I'm suggesting is that after ballots are deposited and before they are counted, they be immediately serialized, presumably with the precinct number and a sequence code. They would then be open for imaging by observers. This could be as simple as an observer having an opportunity to look at, but not touch, the ballot, and to photograph it with a digital camera. In the original idea, the observer could scan the ballot as well, perhaps with a hand scanner attached to a notebook computer, or feed it through a fax machine. It should be possible to scan, photograph, or fax ballots much faster than they ballots can be cast. I would think that a single precinct would not keep a fax machine busy. The ballots would be under continuous observation at this point. For the official count, they could likewise be faxed to a computer, and then they would be locked up. They do not need to be seen directly to be counted. They exist as physical evidence if there is a challenge to the counting process. But with multiple observers taking their own images, plus the public process, those ballots are going to be actually needed only if somebody has tried to manipulate the images, and a credible claim is filed. Note, also, that physical loss of the ballots after this point would not lose the information. The congruence of multiple testimonies as to the ballot images would probably be sufficient legally to prove the information on the lost ballots. So, really, I'm first of all interested if anyone else has even come up with this idea, let alone has written a cogent criticism of it. So if anyone knows where such can be found, I will repeat, I would appreciate it. What this really involves is simply allowing the public to see the ballots, and if the public can see the ballots, the public can verify the election itself, it does not need to depend on elected officials for that. The officials do their job, they report the official results. But everyone is looking over their shoulder, not just a few selected observers. The selected observers are the ones who image the ballots, and the process records what they see, making it possible to count it. It is not actually a major change. But it could result in a major improvement in public confidence. ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info