Warren Schudy-- In your example, there's a candidate, Hitler, who is so despicable that only two people, out of the entire electorate, vote for him. Your example would work the same if there were 100 million voters, with only two Hitler voters.
You have one of the largest factions upranking Hitler to 2nd place. When they do that, of course he's no longer a two-vote candidate, and those voters mustn't be surprised if they elect him. And, if the other large faction truncates, refuses to rank the reversers' candidate, then the reversers will elect Hitler, if the truncators beat their candidate pairwise. What's their chance of benefitting from the reversal? Only if the two big factions are in a pairwise tie. If the reversers' candidate beats the truncators' candidate, then the reversal isn't necessary anyway. So the chance of actually benefitting from the reversal, when there's truncation defense, is negligible. The reversers are _incomparably_ more likely to elect Hitler than benefit from the truncation. In your paper, and your posting, you speak of that election of Hitler as a disadvantage of Condorcet. No, deterrence is an advantage of Condorcet. Yes, the fact that the Blues could even conceivablyl benefit by something that could also elect a two-voter Hitler is a little embarrassment. But, as I said, the best rank methods have so many valuable properties that a little embarrassment is acceptable. Especially because the event will never happen, because it's so well deterred. That last fact is worth emphasizing. I like to point out that the only way you can benefit from offensive order-reversal in Condorcet, MDDA or MAMPO is if your intended victims rank your candidate. You can steal the election from them only if they're trying to help you. Doesn't that make you proud of yourself? Offensive order-reversal is the nearest thing to a strategy problem in Condorcet, MDDA and MAMPO, but it is not a problem. Mike Ossipoff ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
