On Jul 29, 2007, at 21:17 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 01:51 AM 7/29/2007, Juho wrote:
On Jul 22, 2007, at 6:58 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> At 08:17 AM 7/21/2007, Juho wrote:
>> I also think that Range is a good method in non-contentions
polls and
>> elections. But in the statement above a competitive election
was of
>> course the assumption.
>
> Why?
>
> *Assumptions should be stated.* Election methods are used in all
> kinds of situations. If there is an ideal election method for use
> where it would be expected that people will vote sincerely,
> shouldn't we know it?
Yes, it is good to state the assumptions. I however do assume
election scenarios to be competitive unless other assumptions are
explicitly stated. Especially with Range it makes a big difference to
me if one plans to use it in a non-competitive or competitive set-up.
Let me point to something a little deeper. "Non-competitive" means
what? I'd take it as meaning that the electorate wants to
cooperate, to find the best solution for all, and it is assumed
that it is not a zero-sum game. It is often not necessary that
*anyone* "lose."
One possible definition of non-competitiveness is that voters
strongly want such an alternative to win that the society considers
best, not the one that they personally consider best. Practical
examples on elections that may be non-competitive are voting on which
cloud on the sky is the prettiest, or voting on which flavour of ice
cream is the best flavour (everyone will buy their preferred flavour
after the election, they are thus not forced to buy and eat the
winning flavour ice cream), or what movie is the best ever (I believe
www.imdb.com has used some Range like method).
In "competitive" elections, there are winners and losers. While the
game may not be zero-sum, it tends toward it, so voters are
polarized. Which group will get its way, which group will lose and
be disappointed?
By limiting ourselves to "competitive elections," we are limiting
ourselves, actually, to dysfunctional societies. We need to know that.
You are quite ambitious. Making the societies non-competitive is a
huge task. The market economy is for example currently strongly based
on competition (harnessing competition to provide good results for all).
And we don't need to go any further than to this mailing list to see
strong competitive attitudes (on e.g. which method is best).
And there is a conclusion we can make. If we care about improving
the function of society, we should worry that an election method
that works beautifully in a dysfunctional society might actually
inhibit a return to function. If the election method encourages
polarization and competition, it may prevent the society from healing.
So, I'd suggest, we should incline toward election methods that
will make good choices in a cooperative environment, and that will
not make bad ones in a competitive environment. It's possible that
the ideal election method is not so good in the competitive
environment, but if it produces better results when people
cooperate toward the common welfare, it is superior to a method
maximized toward function under conditions of competition.
I think Warren Schudy already pointed out that there is a risk that
changing the voting method with good intentions may in some cases
lead to worse results, not better. The equation is of course complex
(and changes in the spirit of the society are often (but not
necessarily) slow).
However, it looks like we have methods that work best in a
cooperative environment -- and Majority Criterion and Condorcet
Criterion methods can spectacularly fail in this -- and that still
perform as well, approximately, as the best "competitive" methods.
Range is a candidate for this, and Range with runoffs under certain
specified conditions is, arguably, even better.
As discussed many times the strategy problems of Range may be too bad
to be overcome. We should keep seeking for better methods all the
time of course.
In a cooperative environment, where we may assume a much higher
percentage of sincere votes, the Range winner is optimal (though
there is even then, because of the normalization problem, better
result from Range+2), and the runoff rules might even eventually be
discarded, perhaps to be triggered again if signs appear of serious
competition.
In a competitive environment, the runoff rules guarantee what I
consider the bare minimum of democracy, which is majority consent.
So let's be careful!
> And *then* we could look at what happens when some people don't
> vote sincerely? It's clear that there is harm done, under some
> circumstances, but how much harm and who is harmed the most? Is it
> the sincere voters? Or is it those who did not provide accurate
> information to the voting method, so it can't possibly optimize
> their satisfaction?
Unfortunately with Range my understanding is that in a situation
where we have several "parties"/"groupings", some of which vote
strategically and some not, Range is too rewarding to the strategic
groupings.
Note that "rewarding strategic groupings" is not the same as
"harming the public." Elections are not a zero-sum game.
"Too" rewarding is a quantitative judgement. What is "too rewarding"?
The problem of being too rewarding may become obvious to people e.g.
if after ten elections where Democrats have voted strategically
(D=100, R=0) and Republicans have voted sincerely (R=90, D=80) (I
assume that voters were requested to mark their utility values in the
ballots) Democrats have won every election despite of receiving only
a clear minority of votes.
This argument has been presented many times against Range, and I
have never seen an analysis of what "too rewarding" is. Obviously,
something is missing, there are assumptions being made that, for
example, there should be no reward for strategic voting.
Yet every method, to some degree, rewards strategic voting, and the
reward can be large. What is "too rewarding?"
If e.g. strategic voting is often possible, easy to apply, influences
the results and maybe elects some clearly "no-good" candidates.
Until that question is asked and answered, this argument is
essentially meaningless, an opinion without foundation, and quite
likely based on a moralistic judgement about strategic voting. But
strategic voting in Range is unlike strategic voting in ranked
methods. The latter require preference reversals, which are
tantamount to lies. Strategic voting in Range merely requires
truncation, which is not lying.
I think this is quite straight forward. If the method fails under
strategic conditions or becomes something else than originally
intended, then we may have a problem.
By being familiar with "strategic voting" in ranked methods, and
disapproving of it because of the essential deception (which is an
error, a vote is not testimony, it's an action), this disapproval
gets transferred to Range by using the same terminology. Unfairly,
in fact.
Voters express preferences over some scale. They normalize this
scale to their own internal, non-normalized scale, we can presume.
For simplicity, we assume a linear transformation. They take a
piece of their internal scale and lay it over the range of votes
allowed.
If they place the preferrred candidate at the top, and the least
preferred at the bottom, we call this a "normalized sincere vote."
A "fully sincere" vote is actually normalized also, but probably
only at one end, but voters could transfer their *entire* internal
scale to the election range, and probably would vote most
candidates, or all, somewhere in the middle.
In Range there are many possible ways to use the method. I think it
should always be made clear if one asks the voters to mark their
sincere utilities, normalized utilities or "fully extremized"
opinions (with option to cast also weak votes as needed). The Range
problems typically emerge when the voters use the scale in different
ways (strategically or with "more sincere intentions"). For me the
most sincere Range is one where I very seldom use the min and max
values (since I think a typical politician is not the worst choice
for the job nor the best).
*It is up to them*.
In any case, it is no more or less "sincere" in the ordinary
meaning *however* they match their internal scale to the range of
the election, provided they don't *distort*. And some kinds of
distortion would also be, in the ordinary meaning, "sincere." (this
would mean stretching or compressing part of the internal scale
while laying it down.) Only reversal of preference is actually
"insincere."
And if they place their favorite, for example, above the scale of
the range election (or, thinking of it the other way, they lay the
range scale over their internal scale, placing the max rating on it
below the favorite, it then becomes possible for them to max rate
others, "sincerely."
It is a very serious error to term Approval-style voting in Range
as "insincere." There is no basis for it other than a convention,
and such conventions are dangerous, where they create special
terminology, accepted in a specialized field, with implications
quite different from general usage. We get to use big words in
special fields, and we can even coin terms.
Depends on how the voters were expected to vote.
So Warren Smith is right. There are different kinds of strategy,
and Range never encourages reversal, therefore it never encourages
what is, in general usage, "insincere voting." And what I've
mentioned elsewhere about missing candidates, write-ins where the
voter indicates true preference, is possible in Range without harm,
or with harm so small as to be negligible, it depends on the
details. (In Range 2, for example, if the voter voted 2 for a write-
in, and then wanted to maintain preference and so voted 1 max for
other candidates, it would be harmful to this voter's
participation. But the voter in Range 2 would simply vote 2 for the
running candidate and 2 for the write-in. It's pretty obvious from
that vote that the voter prefers the write-in! The voter would not
bother if there was actual equality! And I would treat it this way
in preference analysis.)
> I don't find the answers to these questions obvious. Apparently
> some do.
I think the main rules for Range are quite straight forward. There
are some special cases that raise interesting second thoughts, but as
a main rule I'd say that if some "bigger than marginal" group of
voters is strategic, then Range tends to become "Approval with option
to cast weakened votes".
Which is not harmful. Indeed, my studies show, so far -- all the
details have not been nailed down -- that converting a Range 2
election to Approval harms *all* voters, that is, it reduces their
expected outcome.
Range *is* "Approval with option to cast weakened votes," it does
not become it. And it turns out that those who cast weakened votes,
even if only a few (so few, indeed, that one voter can accomplish
it), *help* not only the strategic voter, but also the sincere ones.
What I mean by "becoming" is that majority of the voters come to the
conclusion that they will use min and max values and forget the mid
values (assuming that they were originally expected/requested to use
also other than min and max values).
By making the election into actual Approval, quite as we would
expect from the simulations, society overall is harmed. So,
consider this as a proposal:
there is some benefit to strategic voters under Approval, under
some scenarios, however, by denying them this benefit by making the
election Approval, we are preventing them from gaining this
benefit, *but nobody is gaining.*
So we are essentially *punishing" strategic voting by forcing
everyone else to vote strategically. I.e., you *will* vote the
extremes, because we are not going to give you any other option,
because if we do, somebody might benefit and that would be BAD.
Please explain it to me, why we should consider strategic votes as
something to prevent. They are a medicine that voters use when they
are sick, when society is sick.
Strategic votes themselves are maybe not a problem if they are just
noise in the election, but if the strategists are able to change the
outcome of the election to something else than the society wants it
to be, that'd be a problem.
I have above argued that Approval style voting is not insincere. It
merely represents a different overlay position and "stretch"
between the internal utilities and the Range Votes than one which
fixes the endpoints at the max an min candidate positions. We vote
that way when we do not trust the rest of the electorate to vote
sincerely. This is a *sickeness*.
(Either ours, or the electorate's or both.)
We know that if everyone votes sincerely, that society overall does
better. It's true, absolutely true, that our own utility may not be
maximized. But the method is such that our utility will *almost* be
maximized. And it is entirely possible, even likely if we assume
that the other votes are sincere, or at least usually sincere, that
the benefit to others really does outweigh my own relatively small
loss.
And routinely, we make decisions that are based on this.
And it comes back to us. If every election maximizes social
benefit, overall, then while I might lose a little in some
elections, I'm quite likely to gain *more* in other elections. Over
a large series of elections, I gain more than I lose.
Essentially, trying to maximize my personal gain in a Range
election by voting Approval style is short-sighted. If everyone
does it, everyone loses, on average.
Note that the "on average" addition is critical. If the strategists
will benefit, that's a good enough reason for them to vote
strategically. Maybe the society lost but they got more. And
typically they think this is the way to go since they expect also
others to vote strategically (which would again balance the
situation, but the voting style has now changed).
These objections to approval are themselves short-sighted, for
essential elements are missing from the argument. How much is "too
much reward." Quantify it and show how it can be expected to happen
in real elections, and it might be worth looking at.
I refer to my earlier (extreme, sorry) example on Democrats and
Republicans.
Otherwise it is simply shallow, knee-jerk thinking. Quite common,
so Juho will find plenty of people to agree with him.
In my terms you are interested also in elections that non-
competitive. That's good. Let's just make it clear when we talk about
competitive and when about non-competitive or less competitive cases
=> Assumptions to be stated. (Term "we want" is just passive "one
wants".)
The default is no assumption, so the logic and conclusions should
reflect the general case. All elections. Then we, for example,
specify "large," to mean that effects that appear when the number
of voters is sufficiently small are neglected. It's not clear what
it means to specify "competitive."
How does this affect conformance with election criteria, such as
the standard ones or the Range or Approval criteria?
If Range is presented to voters as "vote min or max, or a weak
intermediate vote if you like" then voting in Approval style is no
problem. If Range is presented as "mark your sincere preferences,
e.g. R=90, D=80" then Approval style voting should be considered
strategical and those voters that voted as requested may feel
themselves betrayed.
It affects, as far as I can see, the incidence of what is being
called, a bit deceptively, strategic voting.
But that is not clearly defined, because, for reasons I've
explained elsewhere, the internal normalized utilities for
candidates might be 950, but the voter votes 900 because 0 is
really bad, 5 is so bad that the voter does not want to participate
in the election of the 5. This isn't strategic, it is "sincere."
And we can't tell the difference between this and a strategic vote.
Votes are actions, and they have effects. Election methods give
voters certain power, and generally, when you have power,
flexibility in exercising it is to be preferred. Range N is like
giving every voter N votes to cast in an Approval election, it is
like creating, from the voter, N voters, who are going to act as a
cooperative community, since they are really one person with one
common interest. And communities can divide labor or actions.
I say let each community decide how to vote. If they all act
together, sure, they have more power, but that power has been
artificially unified. Fine distinctions are lost, and the result is
loss of intelligence. It's obvious from general principles.
A sane society would never prefer ranked methods to rating methods,
once they understood the latter. This doesn't mean that they would
abandon majority rule, the conflict is illusory and I greatly
prefer that the method make majority consent explicit. No candidate
should be elected without majority consent, ever.
If it is an emergency, and the office *must* be filled, then the
majority can affirm that, quickly, thus choosing the outcome of
some method quickly.
Many arguments about election methods are really arguments about
democracy. Much more than we realize, many people are against
democracy, they do not trust it. Old ideas die *very* hard.
> Approval is a constricted Range method.
>
> Lost in all this is the fact that the general consensus among Range
> advocates is that Approval is an excellent first step. It's cheap,
> it's simple, it's easy to understand. And it *is* Range, just the
> maximally constricted version.
First step to what?
Election reform.
I that would be e.g. the U.S. election reform,
then the second step might be difficult since it may require that the
competitive elections first evolve into more non-competitive (to make
Range really useful). I'm not very optimistic, I think the U.S.
elections are currently quite competitive.
But the first step is to Approval, which works well in a
competitive environment, there are no intermediate ratings, the
point of the argument.
And then the next steps do make a choice, do we go toward ranked
methods or toward sum of ratings methods? Lost in the discussion is
sometimes the fact that Approval is also a ranked method, with two
ranks. Given this, it is Condorcet-compliant. (However, the
Condorcet Criterion is usually interpreted as applying to
unexpressed preferences that it is presumed the voter would express
if the method allowed it.)
And there could be a lot of debate over that. However, the Approval
first step does set one precendent that would probably persevere.
If we were to go to IRV, equal ranking would be allowed. Thus you'd
have another option to reversing rank, making it possible to vote
sincerely in IRV more often without harm. If I'm correct, this
would improve IRV, cutting way back on the center squeeze effect.
It also improves Condorcet methods, in general, to have equal
ranking allowed, and results, probably, in fewer spoiled ballots.
General principle: allow the voters to use the ballot they are
provided. Restricting what they can do, generally, harms democracy.
Forcing them to make choices they don't want to make can be
predicted to be harmful.
I have mentioned this before. One could go in the direction of making
Range Condorcet compliant (use it as a Condorcet completion method).
Or alternatively one can be happy with the fact that in non-
competitive elections/polls Range can pick better candidates (sum of
utilities point of view) than Condorcet would pick.
*Even if the method is Condorcet* using a Range ballot to collect
the information is far more useful, and it allows the study of
election performance. Conversely, if we have a Condorcet ballot
with as many ranks as there are candidates, and there are N
candidates, the election becomes analyzable as Range N if the
voters use it that way, collapsing some ranks to equal vote and
leaving others empty.
And this may actually be optimal Condorcet strategy, I'm not sure.
The real question, to which Juho seems to be assuming an answer
without presenting evidence, is that in *competitive* elections
Range does not choose a better winner.
Range *is* Approval, that is, Approval behavior is allowed in
Range, and contributes to the performance of the method. It is true
that voting Approval style harms the overall utility maximization,
but changing the election from Range to Approval simply
*guarantees* that loss!
Range with almost all strategic voting is obviously not worse than
Approval. It looks like, actually, it is still better, it only
takes a single voter voting intermediate ratings (or three if we
assume that these voters normalize) to improve the utility
expectations over Approval. Isn't that an interesting discovery?
Range with 100% of voters using Approval strategy gives same results
as Approval. Range with some voters voting in Approval style gives
more power to the Approval style voters. Range with one opinion group
voting more in Approval style than other groups favours that
political group.
A general comment. The main problem in these discussions seems to be
the problem of mixing Approval style, normalized votes and fully
utility based votes in Range. Different groups have different power.
The dynamics of the system may drive it towards Approval style
voting, not towards more sincere utility oriented voting.
Juho
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