Juho, --- Juho <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > > I think margins does give a clear reason to not vote for weak > > candidates, > > especially if there's a chance they're strong enough to get a pairwise > > win. > > I still miss the concrete waterproof example. (Sorry if I should have > known which one it is.)
Another example? The 49 24 27 scenario shows that margins can do this. If you believe your favorite candidate is strong enough to beat the better frontrunner but not strong enough to win, you shouldn't vote for him. It's not even safe enough to rank them equally, since you might need to compensate for voters with the same preferences you have but who are choosing to vote sincerely. You frequently say that conditions are so uncertain that who can say whether a strategy is good to use. But surely voters will at least believe they can gauge whether their favorite candidate is likely to win. > >> Ok, that means bullet voting for the strongest. > > > > I'm sorry what? I'm talking about adding functionality to FPP, not > > using > > a certain strategy under FPP. > > Sorry for the unclear linking, I referred to the Condorcet wv > strategy proposal that was discussed before the last paragraph (that > talked about FPP). The WV strategy proposal didn't involve bullet voting. The whole point is that it didn't involve bullet voting. You must think I'm incredibly stupid if you can believe that I would waste all this time discussing WV vs margins if I'm just going to suggest bullet voting under WV. > > I think if you converted a two-round runoff into IRV where all but the > > top two candidates are immediately eliminated, you'd immediately see > > a major hit to sincerity. More importantly I think, you'd see a > > major hit > > to the number of candidates who can get votes. > > See comments below ***. > > >> Yes, I meant sincere voting in Condorcet. I don't believe I can > >> provide you a method that would be immune to strategic voting, but I > >> do believe that in some environments most people would vote sincerely > >> anyway. This is because on average sincere voting can be claimed to > >> bring them the best results. > > > > This is not really true with respect to votes for candidates that > > you do > > not think can win. > > True for candidates that have no chances. And this is a problem. Voters shouldn't have to weed weak candidates out of their ranking before they vote. The method should just ignore those candidates. > >> Hunting for the not so common and not so > >> certain strategic opportunities and then taking part in such "plots" > >> may not be tempting to them. I have seen relatively sincere behaviour > >> in two-round runoff too, so why not in Condorcet. The strategies are > >> a bit different but maybe not that much different. > > > > Two rounds. If you split a Condorcet method into two rounds I think > > you > > will get more sincerity, since more candidates could be considered > > viable, and voters have a chance to adjust for mistakes that they > > otherwise couldn't react to. > > *** Having two rounds doesn't sound dramatically different to me. > Many voters will anyway vote according to the preference order that > they used already at the first round. With Condorcet there is a big difference that candidates you're better off truncating when there's only one round, are *perfectly safe* to vote for if there's a second round with just two contenders. For example, if there are two frontrunners then supporters of those frontrunners may truncate the worse one. But if their preferred of the frontrunners is disqualified in the first round, then these voters have the opportunity to vote for the other frontrunner (or someone else) in the second round, with no risk. I don't know exactly how this two-stage Condorcet method would work, but I think it could fix some problems caused by cautious voting. I suggest this two-round method. It's not Condorcet-efficient or even rank ballot but I think it would be an improvement, and it's quite simple: In the first round you vote FOR one candidate. You also vote AGAINST one candidate. If someone has more than half of the FOR votes, they are elected. If someone has more than half of the AGAINST votes, they are disqualified. Then the second round is between the two candidates with the most FOR votes who have not been disqualified. I think this is much better as a two-round method than a one-round rank method. Kevin Venzke _____________________________________________________________________________ Ne gardez plus qu'une seule adresse mail ! Copiez vos mails vers Yahoo! Mail ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info