I finally figured out what was wrong with this question. The notion that C is a compromise, and even that electing the compromise is desirable, is based upon gathering ballots range-style.
I'd suggest that the zeroes in the last column are improbable if C is acceptable to both A and B voters. That all A-first voters like C almost as much as A but don't like B (or all B voters like C almost as much as B but don't like A) is so improbable I can't believe it would happen. Present 100 separate ranked ballots that result in this semi-counted conclusion. -----Original Message----- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Jobst Heitzig Sent: Wednesday, August 22, 2007 1:55 AM To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com Subject: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there'reonly 2 factions A common situation: 2 factions & 1 good compromise. The goal: Make sure the compromise wins. The problem: One of the 2 factions has a majority. A concrete example: true ratings are 55 voters: A 100, C 80, B 0 45 voters: B 100, C 80, A 0 THE CHALLENGE: FIND A METHOD THAT WILL ELECT THE COMPROMISE (C)! The fine-print: voters are selfish and will vote strategically... Good luck & have fun :-) Jobst _________________________________________________________________________ In 5 Schritten zur eigenen Homepage. Jetzt Domain sichern und gestalten! Nur 3,99 EUR/Monat! http://www.maildomain.web.de/?mc=021114 ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info