Perhaps I failed to emphasize, when I mentioned the withdrawal option a few days ago, that it sharply reduces the incentive to vote strategically? A candidate strategically raised over the sincere winner could withdraw if necessary to elect the sincere winner, and typically would have strong incentives to do so, so why would voters bother organizing to misrepresent their preferences?
If it is agreed that the withdrawal option sharply reduces the voters' incentive to vote strategically, then it makes little sense to choose a voting method based on comparisons only of methods that don't permit withdrawal, and then graft withdrawal onto the chosen method. It makes more sense to include methods that permit withdrawal in the set of methods being compared, and choose a method from this larger set. --Steve ------------------- Juho wrote: > On Nov 30, 2007, at 19:33 , Diego Santos wrote: > > >> I think that cloneproof violation is not severe when a method meets >> Smith. Probably near all majority rule cycles in contetions >> elections will be caused by burying. Then, additional resistance to >> this strategy will be desirable for a Condorcet method. If clone >> independence is desirable too, "Smith,IRV" is an alternative. >> > > Why do you expect burying to be the main reason to cycles? Does this > apply to exceptionally contentious elections only or to all typical > elections? > > The cycles may also be caused also by "random like" variation in > opinions in close races. Also natural cycles where the voter opinions > really are cyclic are quite possible. > > Factors that may reduce the probability of strategic cycles are e.g. > changing opinion poll results before the elections and inability of > the voters to use the strategies in the strategically optimal way. > > In general I tend to think that Condorcet methods are at their best > when strategic voting is not widespread or is not well organized > (=hopefully reduces to just noise). I really wouldn't like to see > general public use all the various Condorcet strategies that are > discussed on this list. In most cases Condorcet based methods are > maybe immune enough to strategic voting (especially when compared to > other commonly used methods). If this is the case then the best > method may be the one that performs best with sincere votes (possibly > slightly random and marginally strategic). > > Juho > > ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
