On Sun, 23 Dec 2007 23:44:56 +0100 (CET) Kevin Venzke wrote: > Dave, > > --- Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > >>So we look for a method suitable for two, or more, candidates, such as: >> Approval - cannot rank 3 candidates as best, worst, and soso >>(matters when voter wants to indicate best is better than soso AND soso >>is >>better than worst). >> Condorcet - allows any number of ranks plus equal ranking such as >>Approval offers. >> IRV - like Condorcet, excluding equal ranking and occasionally >>awarding disappointing choices as to winner. >> Range - like Condorcet but uses ratings instead of ranks. Ratings >>give finer control than ranks, but demand that voters learn to assign >>them effectively. > Seems to me we are agreed as to goals, but are tripping over what I meant when I said "effectively". I MEANT to learn how Range works, and then do the best I could within those rules, such as: best - max score to try for winning. worst - min score to try for losing. soso - this is the hard one - less than max, for I hope for best to win; probably near max to improve odds for soso if best loses.
I see this as properly using "effectively" as an English word. > > "Assign them effectively"? In Range that means rating everybody either the > maximum or minimum score. That's not "fine control" surely. It doesn't > matter how many buttons it has if you're not supposed to push them. > > I would rather say that Range hopes that voters *do not* learn to assign > the ratings effectively. Or if they learn how, they choose not to. > > Kevin Venzke -- [EMAIL PROTECTED] people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info