Arrow's Nobel Prize was awarded because his impossibility proof was general.
I do not know what is meant by "Cardinal methods get around Arrow" - the only way to "get around" that proof is to decide that violation of one or more of the axioms is "ok." How do "cardinal methods" avoid the impossibility proof? _____ From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Juho Sent: Friday, January 11, 2008 1:16 AM To: Election Methods Mailing List Subject: [Election-Methods] Social preference ordering (was: Whymonotonicity?) On Jan 11, 2008, at 6:04 , daniel radetsky wrote: On Jan 10, 2008 7:46 PM, Kevin Venzke <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: I doubt there's good reason to be optimistic about getting around many of these incompatibilities by changing the ballot type. I think you're out to lunch. Cardinal ballot methods get around Arrow and Gibbard, which had been interpreted as meaning "No voting method is fair." If that's not a good reason to be optimistic, I don't know what could be. I think Arrow initially sudied social preference ordering. Loops (e.g. A>B, B>C, C>A) in the social preference ordering are independent of the voting methods, and they exist in the background and may impact voting behaviour in all methods. I don't know exactly what your targets are and how good (/"perfect") the method should be but although cardinal methods have some interesting characteristics my guess is that they will not offer any clear shortcuts. Juho
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