Warren, --- Warren Smith <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : >Our results greatly-contradict the usual previous thinking that the >differences between Condorcet methods in vulnerability to strategy, are >small. That's interesting and new.
>So maybe the internet Condorcet community should now re-evaluate which >Condorcet variants they prefer. (As well as re-evaluate how well they >claim to have "understood" Condorcet strategy. It appears they were >overconfident in their assertions of understanding.) Those of the "internet Condorcet community," who have taken an interest in comparing Condorcet methods' burial resistance, typically don't restrict themselves to the assumption that truncation is not allowed or not a strategy. Thus I don't know whose views you are attacking here. I am more surprised to hear the apparent claim that there may be a Condorcet method that disallows truncation and which is not a total disaster due to burial. Here is Warren's main finding: >THEOREM (BLACK BURIAL-RESISTANCE): In N-candidate elections (N≥3 fixed) >in the random elections model, using pure-rank-orderings as votes, >consider the "burial" strategy where everybody who voted X=top C=second, >now artificially votes C=bottom (but aside from that, all votes >unchanged). Here C denotes the Black-winner with honest votes. Then: with >probability→100% in the #voters→∞ limit, the new winner will be neither >C nor X. And when it is not X, that means burial "does not work." Kevin Venzke _____________________________________________________________________________ Ne gardez plus qu'une seule adresse mail ! Copiez vos mails vers Yahoo! Mail http://mail.yahoo.fr ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info