On Jul 1, 2008, at 16:37 , Kevin Venzke wrote:

--- En date de : Lun 30.6.08, Brian Olson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :

It's worth rating everyone because if you wind up not
getting any of
the ones you 'approve of' you can still have some
say in which of the
rest of them you get.

I don't entirely agree. I would rank below my strategically-determined
approval cutoff (if I suppose the same election could be held also under Approval), but I wouldn't rank that much lower, and I don't think other
voters should either.

Two reasons for this.

1. If you rank everybody and are predictably sincere, burial strategy
by other voters is more likely to succeed against you. People who would
use this strategy need to have doubt about what you're going to do.
Truncating at the (strategically determined) approval cutoff is good at
this: The main effect is that voters don't rank all the frontrunners,
and burial strategy works basically by assuming one frontrunner will
get support from another.

Also heavy truncation is dangerous since that could lead even to extensive bullet style voting (and all the benefits of Condorcet would be lost).

I also think that the probability of successful strategic voting in large public elections is very small in Condorcet. Look for example at the recent Wikimedia elections. If we assume that the final results would be just results of one poll and the actual election would be held next week, would there be some good strategies advices (other than a sincerity recommendation) available for the voters (assuming that the poll information is not accurate, the opinions can change before the election, the planned strategies could not be kept secret, and full coordination of the voters would not be possible)? I think in most such cases Condorcet is safe enough and the threat of strategic burial can be pretty much forgotten. As a result full rankings should be quite safe.

Juho


2. If everyone is persuaded (or forced) to rank all the candidates that
they can, this would seem to add substance to the criticism that there
is no guarantee that "everybody's second preference" (etc.) is any good at all. Typically my response to this criticism is that if a candidate is so bad that his election would be cause to complain about the method, then
voters shouldn't be voting for this candidate in the first place. That
response doesn't work if voters will be advised to rank everybody they can. (You can still argue that Condorcet gives the reasonable result, but to
critics it will still seem like a potentially terrible one.)

I should note that these points are only relevant to Condorcet methods
where truncation is useful in addressing these issues.

Kevin Venzke



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