At 10:37 AM 12/5/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Something I've always wondered about Asset Voting. Say you have a
very selfish electorate who all vote for themselves (or for their
friends). From what I understand, those voted for in the first round
become the electors who decide among themselves who to pick for the
final decision. Wouldn't this produce a very large "parliament"?
No. It would produce a large "electoral college," which doesn't have
legislative power directly. As I'd have it, these small-vote electors
could not introduce motions or speak to the Assembly directly by
right, as anyone with a seat can.
Now, it's not going to happen. Yes, some people will say, "I can't
trust anyone else to vote for me," so these people will become
electors, possibly with only one vote. But this creates a problem
only for this person! The person is now a public voter, all votes
will be public record. If they don't combine their vote with others
to create a seat, they won't have anyone to, say, introduce a motion
that they'd want, unless they can convince someone else with a seat.
They can still vote, if they want, but that could be a lot of work
compared with the obvious: choose someone to represent you in the
Assembly and let that person vote on your behalf unless you *choose*
to participate in an Assembly vote. This isn't the original Asset,
this is hybrid direct/representative democracy Asset, where any
elector can vote on any matter before the assembly. If the elector
votes, the fractional value of one vote is subtracted from the vote
of the seat that represents the elector.
My guess is that only rarely would these fractional votes make a
difference. Remember, just as electors can simply vote for themselves
and are unconstrained in their choices -- beyond choosing a
registered elector, they'd have to register to vote for themselves or
to receive the votes of others -- they are only restrained in their
election of a seat by the need to make, possibly, compromises with
others, which they do deliberatively (i.e, through negotiation; all
that is necessary is to get enough electors together to vote on one
person to elect that seat. There is no opposition, it is pure
democratic cooperation.
So if you are very unrestrained, only people with strong and isolated
positions would find it very difficult to identify someone to
represent you. There is much more that may not occur to people at first blush.
The "selfish voter" problem is self-limiting, not a problem at all.
Asset creates pure representation, unopposed. It's direct democracy
at the elector level, and becomes negotiated representation at the
Assembly level, the purpose of electing a seat being representation
in deliberation, which is where the problem of scale knocks direct
democracy upside the head. This separates deliberation from
aggregation. The electors retain absolute voting power, but they
routinely delegate it to a maximally trusted holder of a seat.
Perhaps the situation that the voters vote for themselves is
unlikely, but some of the problem remains.
It's not a problem, it's a *feature.* There is no candidacy required
to become an elector, just registration. You then can vote to elect
seats, can vote directly in the Assembly if you choose, and there may
be other functions as well. Electors, however, would not be paid,
though they might collect donations from those they represent.
(Should that be prohibited? Probably not, but *limiting* it might
have some value. Some electors might really work full-time
representing their constituents -- who know who they are -- in
communication with a seat holder.)
"Large" is not a limitation in this case, since there are no
large-scale decisions made by the electoral college. Rather, such
decisions would be made in the Assembly, where electors can vote or
not as they choose. If they don't vote, they are still represented,
and I'd expect that to be the norm. It's much more efficient.
Asset's advantage is supposed to be (again, as far as I understand
it) that it involves more people than would be directly elected. So
if it involves too few, that's a problem, but if it involves too
many, that's a problem as well because the deliberative process doesn't scale.
How's that solved?
You've made a basic mistake. The deliberation takes place on a small
scale. Not a large one. There is no "Electoral college election,"
with collective vote on the Assembly to be elected. Rather, when N
electors agree and register this, a seat is created as they have
agreed. It's not an oppositional decision, and these N electors don't
have to convince anyone else. There are plenty of social networking
methods that will work to connect electors so that they can
voluntarily create seats. I'd make the electoral college be,
effectively, an FA/DP organization.
Every elector names a proxy, voluntarily. This has nothing to do,
perhaps, with the official vote of the elector, which might be
delegatable, but this isn't that delegation. It's purely for
negotiation on behalf of the elector. Choose the other elector you
most trust. This creates "natural caucuses" which will be able, I'd
predict, to coordinate recommendations to the electors as to how to
reassign their vote. The decision remains with the elector, not with
anyone else.
It's chosen representation, as minimally constrained by the
necessities of scale, which really never had to do with voting, but
only, as you've noted, with deliberation. Delegable proxy allows
deliberation to take place in *very* small groups, but still
amalgamate consensus on a large scale.
Every seat is elected through consensus of those who choose to trust
the holder of the seat. Don't agree? Vote for someone else, or
continue to vote for yourself in the Assembly, as you can, being an elector.
It's kind of a radically libertarian/anarchist idea, don't you think?
Except that there isn't any assumption about the powers of government
and no tearing down of anything. Simply beginning to realize the
ideal of decisions being made by true representatives of the people.
Not of "a plurality of this district and a plurality of that
district," etc., nor even the much better STV representation, which
can still leave out in the cold a major chunk of the electorate, and
which leaves voters with no idea who *specifically*, they elected
with their vote. In Asset, voters may know with high precision
exactly where their vote went, most of the time. Next election, they
can choose an elector differently, if it didn't work out.
There is no investment in incumbency, every vote counts, and it stays
that way up to the Assembly.
By the way, involving "too few" is also not a problem. If everyone,
for example, freely chose one person to decide on the seats, they
would be electing a dictator. Can a democracy do that?
Yes, it can. But it won't. It would be extraordinarily stupid. And
people aren't that stupid. *Nobody* is smart enough to make all
decisions on their own. To prevent that outcome, though, by
constraining what the people can decide, will cause more damage than
to simply allow the people to become informed, which they will with a
system like this, since their vote always counts, and to make free choices.
I'm actually opposed to supermajority rules, in the long run. They
are good for preventing rash decisions, but, note, generally an
absolute majority can make any constitutional amendment they choose.
Asset makes an absolute majority, through direct vote or
representation, a realistic possibility!
An absolute majority need not even give notice of a pending
amendment! A drastic power, one might think... but there are good
reasons for it. Usually a majority of those voting would think there
should be, at least, wide discussion before making a major change. If
a majority of all people, or their most-trusted representatives,
decide that immediate change is needed, who are we to think that
something else is better?
Absolute majority is a majority of all eligible voters, not a
majority of those voting. The Australians use the world to mean the
latter. Absolute majorities are hard to come by, normally, unless you
use some kind of proxy voting, and most people name a proxy, or
remote voting is used -- which would be normal with Asset for
collecting direct votes by electors.
(Procedural rules would address the difficulties, certain questions,
mostly procedural, would only be presented for decision by seats, but
the procedural rules themselves would always be subject to vote by
all electors, should they so choose. The Assembly could not run away
with the ball, but only play with it as permitted by the electors.)
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