On Sun, Feb 15, 2009 at 11:15 AM, Jobst Heitzig <heitzi...@web.de> wrote: >> Is this true in the general (3 candidate) case, i.e. is the Nash >> equilibrium always for the highest utility candidate to win? > > What do you mean by "highest utility"?
I meant range winner with 'honest' ballots, where the middle candidate is honestly rated, using the 2 other candidates as reference. >> I wonder if the whole process could be implemented as a DSV method. >> You give your honest utilities and then method casts your vote for you >> based on those utilities. It then adjusts your vote based on how >> others vote. The rule would be to find the best Nash equilibrium. > > "Best Nash equilibrium" in what sense? There could be multiple Nash equilibria, where if any ballot is modified, the expected utility would drop for that voter, based on his honest rating. I guess those equilibria could use the same tie breaker as the main method. Each equilibria would have an effective probability vector. A random voter could then be used pick between them. ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
