I was idly doing a Google search for "Condorcet Plurality," and up
popped a question on a site called Cramster (I have no clue what the
site is about, it just came up in the search). Someone a couple of weeks
ago asked:
*Question Details:*
Condorcet’s method has many nice properties, and some supporter’s of
former Vice President Al Gore pointed out that Al Gore was very likely
the Condorcet winner. The problem with Condorcet’s method is that it
does not produce
a winner often. Thus, let us propose a combination of the Condorcet’s
method and the plurality system: This combined system deems the
Condorcet winner as the winner. In case that the Condorcet’s method does
not produce a winner, then use plurality method to select the winner.
1) Does the Condorcet-plurality system produce winner more often than
Condorcet’s
method? Explain.
2) Does the Condorcet-plurality system satisfy the Pareto condition?
Explain.
3) Does the Condorcet-plurality system satisfy Condorcet winning
Criterion? Explain.
4) We know that both Condorcet and plurality systems are monotone. Is
the Condorcet-
plurality combined system still monotone? Explain.
5) Is the Condorcet-plurality system manipulable? If your answer is
manipulable,
give an example of an election where manipulation can be done. If your
answer is not
manipulable, prove it.
Here is the link: http://qaboard.cramster.com/other-topic-5-551512-cpi0.aspx
Hmm, looking at it again, it may be a homework site. Anyway, such
questions often bring up interesting discussions on the EM list, so I
thought I'd let people know.
Michael Rouse
PS If the text is scrambled, let me know. I cut and pasted an html document.
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
