I did not claim naive-exag-strategy is always rational. I merely asked what are the consequences of assuming people do it.
In fact, in Australia, it appears at least about 85% of the voters use naive-exag-strategy with IRV voting -- despite the Lundell claim it is not rational since IRV satisfies later-no-harm. This percentage is easily sufficient to prevent third-party candidates from winning IRV seats. And indeed, in the last 3 Australian house election cycles (150 IRV seat-elections per cycle) combined, the total number of third-party candidates elected, was zero out of 450, despite an average of about 7 or 8 candidates per seat. It appears real-world voters do not care much about what Jonathan Lundell considers to be rational. Personally, I wish (and I daresay he wishes) voters were more like me (him). But they are not. On 10/19/09, Jonathan Lundell <[email protected]> wrote: > On Oct 19, 2009, at 8:50 AM, Warren Smith wrote: > >> But this leads to another interesting idea. Consider this "naive- >> exag" >> voter strategy: rank the two frontrunners A&B (where you prefer A>B) >> top & bottom, then anybody better than A is ranked co-equal top (or if >> that forbidden, then just below A) >> anybody worse than B is ranked co-equal bottom (or if that forbidden >> then just above B) >> and anybody between A&B is ranked between using honest normalized >> utility. > > IIRC, this is a variation on the "bury B" strategy that Clay uses for > his regret simulations. But such a strategy would be anti-rational for > any method (STV, for example) that satisfies later-no-harm. For > example, if my sincere preference is A>B>everyone-else, why would I > strategize A>everyone-else>B in, say, an IRV election? > -- Warren D. Smith http://RangeVoting.org <-- add your endorsement (by clicking "endorse" as 1st step) and math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/works.html ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
