Raph Frank wrote:
On Sat, Nov 7, 2009 at 8:12 PM, Matthew Welland <m...@kiatoa.com> wrote:
It seems to me that approval and range voting eliminate most of the
strategic opportunity in single winner elections and the marginal
improvement of other methods is fairly small.
The recommended strategy in approval is to approve one of the top 2
and also any other candidates who are above your approval threshold.
That's strategy T. Some times (see Rob LeGrand's dissertation defense
slides) a "strategy A" is better: approve all that you like better than
whoever's getting the most Plurality votes, and approve of him as well
if you prefer him to the one in second place on the Plurality count.
(I think it's a Plurality count. Late here, so "vote-getter" may refer
to Approval votes - I'm not sure.)
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