Dear Kristofer, both Approval Voting and Range Voting *are* majoritarian: A majority can always get their will and suppress the minority by simply bullet-voting.
So, a more interesting version of your question could be: Which *democratic* method (that does not allow any sub-group to suppress the rest) has (usually or on average or in the worst case) the least Bayesian Regret. I conjecture that at least when the nomination of additional options is allowed, the method SEC described recently is a hot candidate for this award, since it seems that SEC will lead to the election of the option at the *mean* (instead of the median) voter position, and I guess that in most spacial utility models the mean position is in many senses "better" and will in particular have less Bayesian Regret than the median position. (Recall that in a one-dimensional spacial model where additional options can be nominated, all majoritarian methods likely lead to median positions being realized and are thus basically all equivalent.) Yours, Jobst > -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- > Von: "Kristofer Munsterhjelm" <km-el...@broadpark.no> > Gesendet: 08.11.09 10:23:11 > An: Warren Smith <warren....@gmail.com> > CC: election-methods <election-meth...@electorama.com> > Betreff: Re: [EM] Anyone got a good analysis on limitations of approval and > range voting? > Warren Smith wrote: > >> It seems to me that approval and range voting eliminate most of the > > strategic opportunity in single winner elections and the marginal > > improvement of other methods is fairly small. Can anyone point me to > > analysis, preferably at a layman level, that contradicts or supports this > > assertion? > >> Or, in succinct terms, what are the strategic flaws in approval or range > > voting? > >> Thanks, Matthew Welland > > > > --well... there is the whole rangevoting.org website... > > my more-recent papers at > > math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/works.html > > discuss range voting including some ways it is provably better than every > > rank-order voting system for either honest or strategic voters... > > > > --but those are not exactly "succinct"... > > > > OK Let me try: > > 1. Range for 100% honest voters behaves better than IRV, Borda, > > Condorcet and it is pretty intuitively clear why -- strength of > > preference info used, not discarded. > > There is, of course, the flipside of that property. If one wants a > voting method where the majority wins, then Range won't work, simply > because a minority of strong opinions can outweigh a majority of weak > ones. You might argue that that is no bug at all (strong opinions > *should* outweigh weak ones), but for those for which Majority > compliance is a must-have, it should be mentioned - particularly since > that is supposed to be one aspect of the fairness of traditional democracy. > > In that sense, moving to Range (and perhaps Approval - depends on how > you interpret it) is a more radical proposal than, for instance, moving > to Condorcet (which passes Majority). > > (And now I wonder which election method that passes Majority has the > least Bayesian regret.) > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info