>> Tideman said IRV was unsupportable if it is feasible to compute >> pairwise matrix. That was >> because Tideman had other voting methods he considered clearly >> superior to IRV and these methods used the pairwise matrix. By >> "clearly superior" I mean, so superior in every respect, that Tideman >> felt there was no conceivable use for IRV, ever (in situations where >> it was feasible to compute pariwise matrix) where that use could be >> "supported." >> That is what "unsupportable" means. > > Tideman ranks IRV highest in resistance to strategy, and generally > better than the pairwise methods in lucidity and cost of computation. > How does that translate to those methods being "superior in every > respect"?
--I should have said superior OR THE SAME in every respect, with some superiorities. One method (which is almost the same as but appears better than one advocated by Tideman) which I call "WBS-IRV" is as follows. WBS-IRV: votes are rank-orderings. While a beats-all winner does not exist, repeatedly eliminate the candidate with the fewest top-rankings. This has about the same score as IRV on Tideman's "strategy resistance" and also probably better score on J.Green-Armytage's "strategy vulnerability probability." It has the same properties as IRV among those considered by Tideman (note Tideman does not consider "later no harm" as worth mentioning...) except better in some ways e.g. it elects Condorcet winners. It is equally simple. -- Warren D. Smith http://RangeVoting.org <-- add your endorsement (by clicking "endorse" as 1st step) and math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/works.html ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
