Would this suggest it could be possible to overcome Arrow's theorem using range ballots?
I do not want to say Arrow's theorem is false. All I ask is: Are prefential ballots one of the hypothesis used in Arrow's theorem proof? > From: jlund...@pobox.com > Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2009 11:43:10 -0600 > To: an...@cs.cornell.edu > CC: election-meth...@electorama.com > Subject: Re: [EM] Anyone got a good analysis on limitations of approval > andrange voting? > > On Nov 16, 2009, at 10:53 AM, Andrew Myers wrote: > > > Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: > >> Notice that the requirement of Arrow that "social preferences be > >> insensitive to variations in the intensity of preferences" was > >> preposterous. Arrow apparently insisted on this because he believed that > >> it was impossible to come up with any objective measure of preference > >> intensity; however, that was simply his opinion and certainly isn't true > >> where there is a cost to voting. > > Arrow doesn't impose that requirement; that's not what IIA says. > > This is in part Arrow's justification for dealing only with ordinal (vs > cardinal) preferences in the Possibility Theorem. Add may label it > preposterous, but it's the widely accepted view. Mine as well. > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
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