Dear Raph, you wrote: > Likewise, you might as well pick your favourite as favourite.
This is, unfortunately, not true: The labelled favourite influences the expected ratings against which possible consensus options are compared on each ballot, so you can have the incentive to exaggerate by labelling a more extreme candidate than your true favourite in order to lower those ratings and make your preferred consensus more likely! But this, I guess, will not decrease but rather increase the method's efficiency in realistic examples. > The consensus candidate is different. It is inherently strategic. > > There is the possibility for group "chicken" effects. For example, a > party could say that all of their supporters are going to rate > candidate X at minimum, so there is no point in nominating that > candidate. This could cause the other partys' supporters to disregard > that candidate as a potential consensus candidate. > > Also, I wonder if it might be worth having a rule that allows > additional consensus attempts. > > For example, if 10% refuse, then the other 90% would be given the > option of choosing the consensus candidate. The 2 choices in that > case would be > > Option 1) > Full random ballot > > Option 2) > 90% chance of consensus candidate > 10% chance of random ballot (only the ballots outside the 90% are considered) > > This would probably break the strategic "purity" of the single stage method. I guess so, too, but I think we can overcome the unanimity requirement in a different way. Let me think about it... Yours, Jobst ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info