2010/2/10 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[email protected]> > At 02:16 PM 2/10/2010, Jameson Quinn wrote: > > What if the bribe is payable only after the vote, and only for effective >> votes? (And don't say that the bribegiver can't be trusted. Since corruption >> is often a very cheap investment for the bribegiver, they would not be >> particularly motivated to fail to pay the bribe after the fact. Even if >> trust was lacking, human ingenuity can easily come up with ways of securing >> the deal.) >> > > The real issue is whether or not it would be easier to corrupt a delegable > proxy system than others. >
Although you make a number of other, speculative arguments for why DP should be objectively difficult to corrupt, this is by far your strongest point. Even if DP is corruptible - an idea which, despite your arguments, I still find plausible - I see no reason why it should be more corruptible than any present-day system, or than any other proposed system. Any anti-corruption safeguards could be made to work as well or, in some cases, better under DP than with other systems. Thus, corruptibility is not really a valid argument against DP. (In other words... quit while you're ahead. If you have one good argument, you don't need 3.) Jameson Quinn
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