On Mar 5, 2010, at 8:34 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Mar 5, 2010, at 8:17 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Mar 4, 2010, at 1:04 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
...
so, i'm for Condorcet too. i am sorta agnostic about what to do
about a cycle (because i really doubt it will happen at all often
in reality) as long as it's a sensible resolution (Shulze would be
okay if it was easy for a layman to understand, so probably Ranked
Pairs is the simplest, but i might just say give it to the
Plurality winner in the Smith set to toss the IRV haters a bone).
...
i like Ranked Pairs best, too. and if the Smith Set are three
candidates, it and Shulze pick the same winner.
Matters more that it needs to be explainable in a sales pitch. Fine
tuning can wait til later unless there is a major reason why it should
come up front.
Bringing Plurality in would be a distraction, since we have no need
to go near this method and risk a worse answer.
it's a "worse answer" in a weird circumstance where an argument
could be made that any in the Smith set have some reasonable claim
or legitimacy to be elected. why not the guy with the most votes?
Agreed that all in the Smith set get there by looking good to some.
Seems unhealthy to say anything nice about Plurality in a sales
pitch. As I say below, loading the N*N matrix does not require
knowing who Plurality should pick in this event.
Further, our calculating has not necessarily identified which
cycle member would win this (though my method of doing the N*N
matrix does provide this).
BTW - we should not discourage bullet voting - we should NOT
encourage voters to go beyond their desires, doing what is really
nonsense ranking.
i don't think Condorcet encourages bullet voting at all.
IRV, in our prospects' past, certainly discourages bullet voting -
seems to me their goal is making the numbers prettier rather than
helping voters attain their goals. Our goals are more into helping
voters attain their goals with minimum effort on their part (note that
I suggest voters should stop as their desires indicate - neither
before nor after).
but i *do* think that Approval *does* suggest the possibility of
bullet voting. even though we're limited to 6 in my county, the
weird way that the Vermont State Senate is elected is that all state
senators are elected at large in your county. so then more populous
counties have more state senators than smaller ones (they all get at
least 1). anyway, we vote for up to six out of a zillion candidates
since each party proffers 6 candidates, we have Progs and Greens,
and there are independents. the six candidates with the most votes
are elected. what if there is one, maybe two candidates that you
really think should be elected? i almost never vote for all 6.
usually just 2. but it's a strategic vote. and since i didn't hit
the limit, it's practically no different than Approval voting. i
cannot see how Warren and company claim that it's less strategic
than Condorcet.
Approval's excuse for living is to allow voting for more than one,
without encouraging or demanding doing such.
Condorcet is not ready to get involved in the 6 you describe above.
In electing a mayor or governor approving A+B+C would be less
strategic than indicating your preferences by rank, such as A>B>C.
r b-j r...@audioimagination.com
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