Kevin Venzke quoted me ... --- En date de : Dim 4.4.10, fsimmons at pcc.edu <fsimmons at pcc.edu> a écrit : I waould like to advertise Delegable Yes No (DYN) voting again. It overcomes the main difficulty with Approval, which is that the common voter will will not feel sure about approving or disapproving some of the candidates. Under DYN you check Y next to all of the candidates that you are sure that you want to approve (like your favorite), you check N next to all of the candidates that you are sure that you disapprove (like the candidate you most detest), you leave blank the choices for the candidates you are not sure about, and you circle the name of the approved candidate that you want to delegate the remaining Y/N decisions to. After the sure Y/N votes are counted, the candidates make their proxy votes for their supporters on the delegated choices. The partial talleys already available to them help to counteract disinformation from the media. This is one way to solve the problem 49 C 26 A>B 25 B>A Where the 25 threaten to bullet B.
--end quote .. and then wrote ... I'm not sure that scenario is one that would be repaired. To me that isn't about poor information, it's a game of chicken inherent to a lot of methods. You're just changing who gets to play. I guess an example would be more like this: 51 A>B 5 B 44 C If the 51 voters don't approve B then A can decline to add approval to B at no risk at all. I had a method some years ago called "withdrawable approval" I think, which simulates something like this... I reply: Kevin yours is a better example of the helpful information aspect. But, suppose the candidates could enter into binding contracts with each other about how to "spend" their proxy assets. Then (in my scenario) A could say, "I approve B only if B approves me," or "I give the exact amout of approval to B that B does to me." With that contract in place, B's rational play is to give A complete approval. In general, it seems to me that DYN is as likely to pick the CW (when there is one) as any Condorcet method. In particular, I don't see DYN having the burial problem that most Condorcet methods have with the sincere profile 45 A>C>B (burial strategy vote would be A>B>C) 30 B>C>A 25 C>A>B Under DYN, A 's decision about C isn't going to make any difference, because B is going to approve C to keep A from winning. Forest ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
