Hi Juho, --- En date de : Jeu 8.4.10, Juho <juho4...@yahoo.co.uk> a écrit : > > I more or less despise the election of A in this > scenario: > > > > 49 A > > 24 B > > 27 C>B > > > > I believe the possibility of this outcome is a > disincentive for a candidate > > like C to run. > > The story behind these votes seems to be that C is > ideologically close to B and its nomination makes A win > instead of B. If C is ideologically close to B why don't the > "B" voters vote "B>C" (and make C win)?
Because the story is that C is not considered an established candidate (or a frontrunner), and the B voters (if they actually prefer C, which is not something I mean to suggest) will not condescend to rank C. Depending on the method, they could hand the election to C by ranking C, and/or alternatively compel C supporters to not vote sincerely. The best scenario is for C to be able to run, be voted for sincerely, and either win, or not affect the outcome at all. > If C is > ideologically far from B then most "B" voters may vote as > they do now, but then maybe "A" voters should vote "A>B" > (and make B win) (since C seems to be closer to B than A). > It is hard to find an explanation to sincere votes like > this. Or are these maybe strategic votes, e.g. so that > sincere "A>B" voters have decided to vote "A"? The A voters will not vote A>B because A and B are considered the frontrunners. (i.e. that is the scenario that concerns me.) > > Fundamentally, if I said only one thing: I don't > believe that the margins > > ranking of defeat strength (resulting from its > treatment of unranked > > candidates) is in agreement with what voters would > expect and want. > > What would you consider to be a better approach than > margins for sincere votes? (winning votes has also scenarios > that may be questioned) Maybe Range? I guess I don't see that question as interesting or useful. > (Note btw that in another mail I just mentioned also the > possibility of allowing B and C to formally team up so that > defeats within their team would not be considered as severe > as defeats between A and the team.) This doesn't interest me much (same as Forest's suggestion of pre- election agreements in DYN) because I'm not interested in the case that a single party (for all practical purposes) nominates two candidates. I don't think that will normally happen or be desirable under any method. What I'm concerned with is the viability of a "third" option and voting for the third option. Kevin Venzke ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info