Two questions, before I respond more fully:
1.
2010/4/25 Peter Zbornik <pzbor...@gmail.com>
> (v) asset voting is excluded due to lack of political support
>
Can you clarify? Is the problem with vote secrecy of the "lower" delegates,
and/or with the "back room" process among the "higher" delegates (that is,
the candidates in the current system)? There are versions of asset voting
which avoid either or both problem - the former, by only allowing votes for
"qualified candidates" (however that's defined), and the latter, by having
each candidate pre-declare their transfer order, which is then made public
simultaneously before the vote and used to automate the transfer process. In
other words, it's basically STV with one predeclared ballot type per
candidate.
2.
Would you be interested in another proportional system, based on two-rank
Bucklin ("favor", "approve", or unvoted), which can be explained as STV-like
- that is, candidates accumulate a pile of a droop quota of (possibly
fractional) ballots to win, no ballot fraction is in more than one pile or
in a pile it doesn't approve. The advantages over STV are that my system is
monotonic, because it can find condorcet-like compromise winners for each
proportional segment of voters; that it's simpler to vote, either a
considered individual ballot, a "vote for one candidate, approve one
faction" simple vote, or a "party-line" factional vote; and that, unlike
STV, it has a good single-winner special case. The disadvantages are that
it's completely unknown as a system, that the internal mechanics are
complicated (except for single winner), and that I don't have a working
implementation - but I would be willing to code one if you're interested. If
you are, I would be happy to say more about this.
Jameson Quinn
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