On Apr 28, 2010, at 2:19 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:

Condorcet methods have not been used in politics yet, I think.

Condorcet has not yet been used in a *government* general election. that does not mean it hasn't been used in politics. it has been used in organization elections for a single winner. i might consider the Czech Green Party to be an "organization". you can choose to use whatever method you like without having to get a law passed as you would in a general election.

Are there by any chance other methods to elect centrist presidents?

Condorcet *does* tend to favor centrist candidates because Condorcet makes good use of 2nd-choice rankings and people on the two extreme wings are likely to choose the centrist for their 2nd choice over the extremist on the other side.

but that is not a good reason to use Condorcet. there are many reasons to use Condorcet but the main reason is simply majority rule:

    If a majority of voters agree that Candidate A
    is a better choice than Candidate B, then
    Candidate B should not be elected.

that's really it. that's why Condorcet is the correct method over IRV- STV, Plurality, Borda, Bucklin, Range, Approval or whatever else they come up with. it's simple, transparent, and directly compatible with the goals of majority rule.

despite Kathy Dopp's knee-jerk reaction against STV, it probably remains to be the simplest fair method to get proportional representation for the multi-winner Council seats. IRV proponents like to extend STV to single-winner, but it's pretty well established that it's inferior to Condorcet. sometimes they elect the same winner and sometimes they don't. the problem is when IRV fails to elect the Condorcet winner - when that happens, a majority of voters agreed that Candidate A is a better choice than Candidate B, yet Candidate B was elected.

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"Imagination is more important than knowledge."




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