Dear Peter Zbornik, the fact, that the Schulze single-winner election method satisfies the majority criterion, is a direct consequence of the fact that every pairwise victory is stronger than every pairwise defeat.
Similarly, the fact, that the Schulze proportional ranking method satisfies the proportionality criterion for the top-down approach, is a direct consequence of the fact that every link H[A(1),...,A(n-1),x,y] from an outcome {A(1),...,A(n-1),x} in agreement with the proportionality criterion to an outcome {A(1),...,A(n-1),y} in disagreement with the proportionality criterion has a strength of more than N/(n+1) and that every link H[A(1),...,A(n-1),y,x] from an outcome {A(1),...,A(n-1),y} in disagreement with the proportionality criterion to an outcome {A(1),...,A(n-1),x} in agreement with the proportionality criterion has a strength of less than N/(n+1). This means that every path from an outcome in agreement with the proportionality criterion to an outcome in disagreement with the proportionality criterion has a strength of more than N/(n+1) and that every path from an outcome in disagreement with the proportionality criterion to an outcome in agreement with the proportionality criterion has a strength of less than N/(n+1). This means that every outcome in agreement with the proportionality criterion disqualifies every outcome in disagreement with the proportionality criterion. Markus Schulze ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info