You seem to use implicit approval cutoff at the end of the ranked
candidates (since you say "based on ranked ballots with truncations
allowed"). How about using explicit cutoff? Would that take away
something essential? I'd like the left wing voters rank also the right
wing candidates and vice versa. Otherwise we might easily lose a
sincere Condorcet winner.
Juho
On May 8, 2010, at 9:32 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
I have a proposal that uses the same pairwise win/loss/tie
information that Copeland is based on, along with
the complementary information that Approval is based on. It’s a
simple and powerful Condorcet/Approval
hybrid which, like Copeland, always elects an uncovered candidate,
but without the indecisiveness or clone
dependence of Copeland.
I used to call it UncAAO, but for better name recognition, I’m
changing the name to Majority Enhanced
Approval (MEA).
The method is extremely easy to understand once you get the simple
concept of covering. Candidate X
covers candidate Y if candidate X pairwise beats both Y and every
candidate that Y beats pairwise.
MEA elects the candidate A1 that is approved on the greatest number
of ballots if A1 is uncovered.
Otherwise it elects the highest approval candidate A2 that covers A1
if A2 is uncovered. Otherwise it elects
the highest approval candidate A3 that covers A2 if A3 is
uncovered. Otherwise, etc. until we arrive at an
uncovered candidate An, which is elected.
MEA satisfies Monotonicity, Clone Independence, Independence from
Pareto Dominated Alternatives, and
Independence from Non-Smith Alternatives, as well as all of the
following:
1. It elects the same member of a clone set as the method would
when restricted to the clone set.
2. If a candidate that beats the winner is removed, the winner is
unchanged.
3. If an added candidate covers the winner, the new candidate
becomes the new winner.
4. If the old winner covers an added candidate, the old winner
still wins.
5. It always chooses from the uncovered set.
6. It is easy to describe: Initialize L to be an empty list.
While there exists some alternative that covers
every member of L, add to L the one (from among those) with the
greatest approval. Elect the last
candidate added to L.
What other deterministic method (based on ranked ballots with
truncations allowed) satisfies all of these
criteria?
Forest
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