Hi Kristofer, thanks,
so is it right to state, that: "The only advantage of Contingent vote before Schulze in terms of satisfied criteria is in the case of three candidates, where the Contingent vote satisfies Later-No-Harm"? Peter On Thu, Jun 17, 2010 at 2:00 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm < [email protected]> wrote: > Peter Zbornik wrote: > >> Hello, >> >> an other question I wonder if you could help me with: >> For single winner elections we currently use the two round system, which >> is equivalent to the Contingent vote providing that the voter does not >> change preferences see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two-round_system and >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contingent_vote >> >> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contingent_vote>According to the table on: >> >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method#Comparison_with_other_preferential_single-winner_election_methods >> , >> Contingent voting < >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sri_Lankan_contingent_vote> has no advantage >> over Schulze method (apart from being a few dimensions simpler in terms of >> vote count and understandability for the common person). >> >> Two-round voting (although widely used) is not listed in the table. >> >> The questions are: 1) Does the two-round system satisfy any criteria, >> which Schulze method fails, apart from complexity and understandability and >> the option to change preferences between election rounds? >> > > If voters vote exactly the same way in both rounds, and there are three > candidates, the two-round method is equal to IRV. In this case, it passes > LNHarm while Condorcet does not. > > If the voters don't, then it makes no sense to apply criteria to the > two-round system as a whole. If you did, you could make the two-round system > fail Majority unless it had a rule stating that there would be no second > round in case of a majority preference. Just have a majority vote for A, the > minority for B, then in the second round, have everybody vote for B. > > > 2) What criteria does the two-round system satisfy that the Contingent >> vote does not satisfy and vice versa? >> > > See above. One can't apply criteria that applies to a single ballot set to > a two-round method if the voters change their preferences between the > rounds. If they don't, then the two-round method is simply the Contingent > vote and so the compliances must be equal. >
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