On Aug 14, 2010, at 6:45 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Aug 14, 2010, at 2:18 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
the other method, BTR-IRV (which i had never thought of before
before Jameson mentioned it and Kristofer first explained to me
last May), is a Condorcet-compliant IRV method. i wonder how well
or poorly it would work if no CW exists. i am intrigued by this
method since it could still be sold to the IRV crowd (as an IRV
method) and not suffer the manifold consequences that occur when
IRV elects someone else than the CW. does "BTR" stand for "bottom
two runoff"? and who first suggested this method? is it published
anywhere? Jameson first mentioned it here, AFAIK. the advantage
of this method is that is really is no more complicated to explain
than IRV, and it *does* resolve directly to a winner whether a CW
exists or not. i am curious in how, say with a Smith Set of 3,
this method would differ from RP or Schulze.
For Condorcet you have the N*N matrix and precinct summability but,
unlike IRV, you better do nothing that involves going back to look
at any ballots.
i guess you're right. i was just intrigued about this variant of IRV
that is Condorcet compliant. but the actual method should be precinct
summable so that leaves BTR-IRV out.
--
r b-j r...@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
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