Chris wrote:
BTW, I also like the version of Smith//Approval that allows voters to indicate
an
approval threshold so they can rank among unapproved candidates.
Kevin responded (10 Nov 2010):
I still don't. I don't understand why you should be allowed to vote
nonsense rankings and not have to stand by them when you succeed in
creating an artificial cycle. It means burial strategy only backfires when
the pawn candidate becomes the CW, which basically means burial is safe
as long as only one faction is doing it.
I think it's arguable that encouraging truncation goes against the
spirit of the Condorcet criterion,
and I hate random-fill incentives. I just think that the winner of
Smith//Approval (threshold) can
never be too bad (SU-wise) or silly.
Arguing against results arising from "nonsense rankings" to me is almost
an implicit criticism of
the Condorcet criterion itself.
Chris Benham
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