Forest wrote (13 Nov. 2010):
<snip>
I'm not a die hard Condorcet supporter. In fact my truly favorite
methods are neither Condorcet efficient
nor deterministic; hence the title of this thread is intended to
connote a deliberate restriction of attention
to lesser evil methods that might be acceptable to Condorcet
enthusiasts. So far most Condorcet
supporters seem to think that we have to have cycles, and
therefore.the important thing is how to deal
with them rather than how to prevent them.
Nor am I a die-hard Condoret supporter, but I'm intolerant of methods
that aren't deterministic.
I have sympathy for the philosophical view that the winner must come
from the Smith or Schwartz set.,
but not for the view that there aren't other desirable "representative"
criteria regarding which member
of that set we elect.
25: A>B
06: A>C
32: B>C
27: C>A
10: C
TACC's election of A here is unacceptably silly because C is so
dominant over A.
I consider not electing C here somewhat embarrassing, but I have
defended a couple
of methods that elect B: IRV and Smith,IRV.
But IRV is completely invulnerable to Burial strategy, and Smith,IRV is
a Condorcet method
that keeps some of that IRV quality: Mutual Dominant Third candidates
are invulnerable to
Burial.
In the example above we can see that C could be a sincere DMT candidate
that has been
successfully buried by the 25 A>B voters (sincere may be A or A>C) in TACC.
I think that if for the sake of defensive strategy and/or higher
Social Utility we encourage voters to
truncate, then it is better to dump the Condorcet criterion in favour
of the Favourite Betrayal criterion
(while "making do" with other representative criteria compliances.)
So I certainly prefer IBIFA (my favourite FBC method) to TACC and
Winning Votes and Margins.
Chris Benham
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