matt welland wrote:
On Tue, 2011-05-24 at 22:42 +0000, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
On the other hand Approval requires reliable polling information for
informed strategy. This fact makes Approval vulnerable to
>> manipulation by disinformation.
Is this a generally accepted truth? I don't think I agree with it,
can you point me to more information or explain? The only strategy in
approval is to hold your nose and check off the front runner you
despise because you don't want the other front runner you despise
more to win. But I think this is only a factor for the period after
transitioning to approval from a plurality system. In the longer term
both the candidates and the voters will change. I think the change
would be for the better, candidates would generally be more
accountable, voters need only decide who they could live with as
leaders and it is worth it to listen to what the minority players are
saying - giving them your vote is both possible and meaningful. I
guess most of these would be true (perhaps more so) for asset voting
also.
The strategy holds even when there are more than two frontrunners.
AFAIK, the best strategy (LeGrand's strategy A) is "approve all you
prefer to whoever has the most votes, then vote for that one if you
prefer him to the one who has second most".
When there are only two frontrunners, that's simple enough: you vote for
the frontrunner if you prefer him to the other guy. When there are more
than two, however, the importance of polls increases, since you have to
know who is currently in the lead and who is second.
In between, there could be an uncertainty point. For instance, in the
2000 example, if Nader has no chance, you approve of him and Gore (but
not Bush). If Nader has a lot of support, you vote for Nader alone
because you want to make sure Gore doesn't win. But if Nader has just
about the same chance to win as Gore, then it gets tricky.
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