On 8.6.2011, at 18.58, Jameson Quinn wrote: > > In SODA I'm most worried about the Approval related problems, > > Do you mean the near-clone game-of-chicken problems?
Yes. > These apply to WV Condorcet methods too (although less-obviously to an > unsophisticated voter), and with margins, there is the opposite burial > problem: All methods have problems. We need to evaluate their importance in practical elections one by one. > > 35: A>B > 25: B > 40: C > > What if, instead of being a game of chicken between A and B Did B already truncate? > , this is a trick where A is burying their natural ally C? Many strategies have such mirror images. > > In general, I think that by reducing the number of players in the game of > chicken, and providing perfect information to those players, SODA does more > to avoid these problems than any non-asset, non-revoting-runoff system I can > think of off the top of my head. The game of chicken is not an easy problem > to solve, because if you try too hard, you end up with the opposite problem. Yes, finding the best balance is not always easy. At least it takes time to identify and analyze all the possible scenarios and their problems. Btw, I tend to think that often it is even better to fail multiple criteria than only few. The reason is that when one violates multiple criteria then it may be possible to violate each one of them only so little that it does not cause andy meaningful problems. The weakest link of a chain may be strongest when one does not spend all one's available resources and material in making only few of the links as strong as possible. > > maybe also possible trading of votes, but it is an excellent idea and method > anyway. In general a good approach when recommending different methods could > be to list sincerely the benefits and problems and recommended use for each > good method (good = can be considered to be a local optimum in some > environments). The list of recommended methods could be a long one, a short > one, targeted for certain target audiences or maybe all possible > (single-winner and/or multi-winner) environments. > > From my experience talking to normal people not already interested in voting > or math, I think that it is very important to keep your list of proposals > short. 1 is good, 2 is tolerable, 3 is approximately pointless, and anything > more is clearly counterproductive. My experiences in negotiations say that it is usually best to have only one proposal, with one option that the decision makers can then "solve" in the correct way. :-) > > > Since I understand that I'm probably not going to convince the condorcet > supporters here, I'm willing to include a Condorcet proposal. Do you think it is a mistake to include Condorcet methods? Of course this depends on where you are going to make that proposal. If Condorcet methods do not have any chances, then it may be better not to include them, except as targets that can be shot down to make some other methods look better :-). But if we are talking about practical promotion of methods, the environment may require the input to be written for that environment only. Theoretical material that aims at collecting best available information together is a different animal. > Since I value offering a simple option, I think that proposing (Some > Condorcet) or SODA is better than just advocating (Some Condorcet). Still, I > strongly urge that our statement should not go beyond two well-explained > proposals, though it should endorse by simple mention a number of other > systems (Schulze, Range, MCA, MJ...). I think I covered these matters already in another mail. I don't know yet what your targets are (what kind of a paper, for what audience). Juho > > Jameson > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
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