Kevin Venzke wrote:
Is Condorcet//FPP a bad method?
I agree with Jameson Quinn, the gap is too far and so it could be quite tempting to compromise as in FPTP (and failing that, to engineer a cycle if your candidate has great first place support).
Smith,FPP... perhaps better, but there's still a gap between the Condorcet and the FPP part.
If you want something that deters burial strategy, how about what I called FPC? Each candidate's penalty is equal to the number of first-place votes for those who beat him pairwise. Lowest penalty wins. Burying a candidate may help in engineering a cycle, but it can't stack more first-place votes against him. Unfortunately, it's not monotone.
Finding the most strategy-resistant monotone Condorcet method is an interesting problem. If you permit approval cutoffs, UncAAO and C//A are probably quite good, but if not... what, I wonder? Perhaps some Ranked Pairs variant where winning contests are sorted ahead of losing contests, and then sorted further by FPP score of the first person in the ordering (e.g. A for A>B and B for B>A)? Or some Maxtree generalization. Who knows?
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