Hi Jameson, --- En date de : Mar 14.6.11, Jameson Quinn <jameson.qu...@gmail.com> a écrit : [start quote] Of course, this causes favorite betrayal strategy, because you may care more about giving a penalty than about helping your honest favorite. And this strategy is "obvious" enough that I think people would overuse it, even when there was an honest CW (for instance, Nader voters in a Nader/Gore/Bush scenario).
One way to avoid such "overfitting" (solving one problem but causing another) is to have a runoff between the winners of two different methods, if they differ. For instance, minimax and FPC. Of course, that throws simplicity entirely out the window. [end quote] I am torn on the runoffs. Experimentally they seem to be very effective at selecting the sincere CW winner, no doubt because they can go to the voters twice, with the second time having sincerity assured, so the voters can correct errors of the first round. They can avert disasters. But, again experimentally, they seem to have some of the worst insincerity in the first round. While this might be acceptable on balance, it makes me think that it is a waste to use methods of much complexity there. Kevin Venzke ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info