A system based purely on candidates freely transferring their votes until a majority (or Droop quota) is reached is called Asset voting. I believe that Asset voting is a good system, though there are certainly those who'd disagree. It is also possible - and I'd say desirable - to combine aspects of Asset with other systems productively. One such proposal, SODA<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/SODA>, is currently my favorite practical reform proposal, something I have real hopes for. So I'd certainly say you have (reinvented) some good ideas here.
With that said, I can see a couple of problems with this system right off. First off, bottom-up elimination is probably the worst feature of IRV, because there is a fairly broad range of situations where it leads inevitably to eliminating a centrist and electing an extremist, in a way that can clearly be criticized as "spoiled" (the centrist would have won pairwise) and "nonmonotonic" (votes shifting to the winner can cause them to lose). Secondly, a voter has no power to ensure that their vote is not transferred in a way they do not approve of. This second disadvantage compounds with the first, because a minority bloc will be eliminated early, and their votes transferred more than once before the final result. Cheers, Jameson 2011/7/4 Russ Paielli <russ.paie...@gmail.com> > Hello, > > I was somewhat active on this mailing list for a short time several years > ago. How is everyone doing? > > I have an idea for a single-winner election method, and it seems like a > good one to me. I'd like to know if it has been considered before and, if > so, what the problems are with it, if any. Here's how it works: > > The mechanics of casting a ballot are identical to what we do now (in the > US anyway). Each voter simply votes for one candidate. After the votes are > counted, the last-place candidate transfers his or her votes to the > candidate of his or her choice. Then the next-to-last candidate does the > same thing, and so on, until one candidate has a majority. > > The transfer of votes at the close of polling could be automated as > follows. Weeks before the election, each candidate constructs a ranked list > of his or her preferences for the other candidates. The resulting preference > matrix could (should?) be published for the voters to see in advance. The > bottom candidate at each round of transfers would then have his or her votes > automatically transferred to the top remaining candidate in his or her > preference list. > > The transfer of votes from the bottom finisher in each round resembles IRV, > but note that this method is "summable" -- a major advantage over IRV, > eliminating the need to maintain a record of each and every vote cast. I > think it may also have other major strategy-deterring advantages over IRV. > What do you think? Thanks. > > Russ P. > > -- > http://RussP.us > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > >
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