Kevin, Do we agree that working from closest pairs outward solves the Plurality problem (at the expense of compromise and less monotonicity)?
> From: Kevin Venzke > > Hi Forest, > > --- En date de?: Ven 15.7.11, fsimm...@pcc.edu > a ?crit?: > > > I think I will try implementing the "eliminate the > > pairwise > > > loser of > > > the most distant pair" method. I am curious how well > > it would > > > discourageburial. I wonder also how often it would > > fail Plurality... > > > > Kevin,? the method fails Plurality, and is vulnerable > > to burying.? Its strong point should be with regards to > > compromising. > > I did one test (1D spectrum) with a (too) small number of trials and > it seemed good there. It was a lot like WV, but a bit better > across the > board. I do wish we could get the compression incentive down. > > (Incidentally, this seems to be an advantage of the MinMax > method where > you count the number of voters who would actually have been able to > avert a cycle. That is, you have to actually vote C>B>A in order to > "complain" when B>A gets overridden. And you are not counted as > a voice > for respecting the C>B contest, because you have no way to > threaten to > change your ballot should C>B be overturned.) > > It occurred to me that a very "distant" pair of candidates are, in > practice, often going to be the frontrunners, registering as "distant" > because voters don't want to vote for them both. In that case we are > probably cutting out the "wrong" one early in the process. But after > that point we get the Plurality failures, as nothing stops the "right" > frontrunner from being cut down by a noise candidate not generally > viable. > > I was trying to think of how we could just stop after one comparison. > I tried a few versions of something like the following: Find the pair > of Schwartz candidates, if there is more than one (i.e. let's > not fail > Majority Favorite), with the greatest "approval distance," which is > basically the sum of the "approval opposition" in each > direction. Just > elect the winner of that contest. (Break ties probably by > approval of > the pairwise winner.) > > I think the non-monotonicity of "approval distance" wouldn't be > a huge > practical problem. I might be wrong but it seems like an unintuitive > strategy to remove the approval distinction between your > candidate and > the frontrunner who beats him pairwise. Even if you do it I > wonder in > how many situations you would have reason to expect it to work? > > Unfortunately, so far my methods (SCAD - "Single Contest Approval > Distance") don't seem to be very good. > > Kevin Venzke > > > > ------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > Election-Methods mailing list > Election-Methods@lists.electorama.com > http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods- > electorama.com > > End of Election-Methods Digest, Vol 85, Issue 54 > ************************************************ > ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info