2011/8/15 <fsimm...@pcc.edu> > > > The study of voting systems has made significant progress over > > the last > > decade, and our understanding is even farther beyond what it was > > 20 years > > ago. One important place where that has happened is on the > > election methods > > mailing list. This mailing list is likely to include the largest > > and most > > diverse group of voting systems theorists in the world. It is a > > place where > > opinions vary and debate is vigorous. Thus, we think that the > > broad, though > > imperfect, consensus on the following ideas is worth paying > > attention to. > > > > We believe that the voting systems currently used in most of the > > English-speaking world, including single-round plurality voting > > (also termed > > First Past the Post, FPTP) and single-member districts (aka > > seats, ridings, > > or electorates), represent some of the worst voting systems > > known. We > > believe that reforming these systems would provide important societal > > benefits, and that there are clearly not corresponding reasons > > to oppose > > such reform from the perspective of the public interest. We may > > disagreeabout which specific reforms might provide the > > absolutely optimum results, > > but we can nevertheless agree that there are a number of options > > which would > > represent worthwhile improvements. > > > > *Single-winner reform* > > > > There are various criteria, both formally-defined and informal, > > by which one > > can judge a voting system. These criteria can be divided into several > > classes: > > > > 1. Honest-results-oriented criteria. These include such measures > > as Bayesian > > regret (that is, simulated societal satisfaction), the majority > > criterion,and the Condorcet criterion, which focus on whether > > the "correct" candidate, > > according to some definition, is elected. Although these > > criteria in some > > cases can favor different candidates as being "correct", in most > > practicalcases they agree. > > > > 2. Strategy-resistance criteria. Voting is a complex process, > > and inevitably > > there are some cases where some group could get an advantage by > > changingtheir votes. It is desirable to keep such cases to a > > minimum. For one > > thing, it's fairer not to reward such strategic voting behavior. > > But it's > > not just that. Perhaps more importantly, a voting system which > > gives too > > much of an incentive to strategic voters, can lead to widespread > > strategywhich systematically distorts the results. > > > > 3. Process-oriented criteria. These include such measures as > > simplicity of > > the ballot, simplicity of the ballot-counting process, and > > feasibility of > > auditing or other fraud-prevention measures. > > > > 4. Candidate-incentive criteria. Systems which encourage or discourage > > "clone candidates"; give too much power to parties, as opposed > > to voters; > > have problems here. These criteria also include less strictly-defined > > concerns about the type of candidates and campaign strategies a system > > encourages; for instance, systems which effectively reduce the > > field to 2 > > major candidates could encourage negative advertising. > > > > There is a broad consensus among researchers plurality voting is > > among the > > worst systems for honest results, for strategy-resistance, and > > for candidate > > incentives. Honest voting can split votes among similar candidates, > > "spoiling" the election and leading opposing candidates to win. Voters > > respond by strategically choosing the "lesser evil" among the > > two major > > candidates, which can lead to complacent candidates because even > > corrupt,widely-disliked candidates can win. The system > > discourages candidates from > > entering the race, and encourages negative advertising. Although > > pluralityhas good simplicity and fraud-resistance, this is not > > enough to recommend > > its use. > > > > A number of proposed single-winner replacements for plurality exist. > > Although theorists can not find consensus about which of these > > systems is > > best, we can agree that many of them are clearly head-and- > > shoulders above > > plurality. Systems advanced as as best by some of us, and > > accepted as good > > by all of us, include (in categorical and alphabetical order): > > > > Put Approval Voting here in alphabetical order,
Is there anyone who feels that Approval is better than all the other systems listed here? I think that's true for each of the others; the list is supposed to be systems someone thinks are best and (almost) no-one (reasonably) thinks are worse than plurality. > and mention that each of the > following methods is a generalization of Approval in a slightly different > direction. In other words all of the most highly esteemed methods on the > EM > list turn out to be generalizations of Approval I know that you made this > point > in a slightly different way, but it could easily be passed over without > registering mentally if we are not careful. > OK, that's a good suggestion. We'll do that when we get to editing details. JQ
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