I very much agree with Jameson Quinn that the time has come to write,
sign, and widely distribute a formal statement of the election-method
principles that we agree upon. Yet instead of just providing a checklist
of what we approve, I suggest we take advantage of this opportunity to ...
* ... inspire(!) policymakers, politically active citizens, and
frustrated voters to take action, and ...
* ... give them a clearly explained declaration they can use as
ammunition in their battles to implement election-method reforms.
To serve these purposes, I'm boldly suggesting an entirely new wording.
Keep in mind that one of my professions has been to work as a technical
writer specializing in translating especially complex technology into
clear English, and I also have experience writing marketing materials.
This version incorporates the suggestions and refinements already
discussed, so the revision work already done is not being wasted.
Previously I too was thinking that the other version was too long.
Ironically this version is even longer. I now realize that the other
version went into too much detail about subtle issues, and that's what
made it seem long. In contrast, this version uses the extra words to
clearly explain fundamental voting concepts that most people do not
already understand, and to serve the above-listed purposes.
Also I think (or at least hope) that this version better identifies our
real areas of agreement.
My hope is that either this version, or a merging of this version with
other versions, will produce a declaration that we can sign with much
more enthusiasm.
----- The Declaration of Election-Method Experts -----
We, the undersigned election-method experts from around the world,
unanimously denounce the use of "plurality" voting in elections in which
there are more than two candidates, and in this declaration we offer
ready-to-adopt replacement election methods that we agree will reliably
produce much fairer results.
We agree that there are no perceived political or economic risks
associated with adopting the election methods recommended here. In fact,
we believe that improving the fairness of election results will produce
many political and economic benefits. Some of the benefits we expect
include reduced voter frustration, reduced government costs (that arise
from excessive political influence from self-serving special interests),
wiser use of tax dollars (based on electing problem-solving leaders who
solve underlying problems that waste money), dramatically increased
voter turnout because of having meaningful choices, increased compliance
with laws including taxation laws, and likely increases in widespread
economic prosperity (arising from increased fairness in the business world).
We use the term "plurality" voting to refer to the commonly used
counting method in which each voter marks only a single choice on the
ballot, and the number of marks for each candidate are counted, and the
candidate with the highest number is regarded as the winner. In some
nations this method is called "First Past The Post" (and abbreviated
FPTP). Although this election method produces fair results when there
are only two candidates, the results are often dramatically unfair when
this approach is used in elections with three or more candidates.
In spite of its well-known weaknesses, plurality voting is predominantly
used in most elections in most democratic nations around the world, with
Australia and New Zealand being notable exceptions. It is also the
preferred election method in nations that pretend to be democracies, yet
lack the freedoms and economic benefits of democracy.
Unanimously we agree that the kind of ballot used in plurality voting is
not appropriate when there are more than two choices. Its deficiency is
that it does not collect enough preference information from the voters
in order to always correctly identify the most popular candidate when
there are more than two candidates.
Unanimously we agree that there are three kinds of ballots that collect
enough preference information to always, or almost always, correctly
identify the most popular candidate. The names and descriptions of these
ballot types are, in alphabetical order:
* Approval ballot, on which a voter marks each candidate who the voter
approves as an acceptable choice, and leaves unmarked the candidates who
are not acceptable
* Ranked ballots (or 1-2-3 ballots), on which a voter indicates a first
choice, and optionally indicates a second choice, and optionally
indicates additional choices at lower preference levels
* Score ballots, on which a voter assigns a number for each candidate,
with the most familiar versions of such voting being to rate something
with 1 to 5 stars or rate a choice with a number from 1 to 10, but any
range of numbers can be used
The type of ballot used in plurality voting does not have an
academically recognized name, but the term "single-mark ballot" can be
used to refer to this primitive ballot type.
Why is the unfairness of plurality voting not better known? Single-mark
ballots do not collect enough information to reveal the actual
preferences of voters in elections that have three or more reasonably
popular candidates. This lack of full preference information makes it
nearly impossible for anyone to produce clear proof, or even evidence,
of unfair election results.
Adopting any of the three better ballot types would provide the
information that is needed for fair results. In addition, for comparison
purposes, the preferences on the three better ballot types can be
interpreted to reveal who would have won the election if plurality
counting had been used. Such comparisons will quickly reveal the
dramatic unfairness of plurality voting in elections involving three or
more candidates.
These three better ballot types can be counted in different ways to
produce different results. As election-method experts we have both
developed and analyzed many counting methods, and we now agree that
there are several counting methods that are worth adopting in
governmental elections.
Four of the counting methods that we agree would produce significantly
better results compared to plurality voting are, in alphabetical order:
* Approval voting, which uses approval ballots and identifies the
candidate with the most approval marks as the winner.
* Bucklin voting, which uses ranked ballots, and which initially counts
only the most-preferred candidate on each ballot, and identifies a
winner only if that candidate receives a majority of votes, and which
successively adds consideration for lower-ranked candidates until a
majority outcome is reached.
* Condorcet methods, which use ranked ballots and pairwise counting to
compare each candidate with each of the other candidates, with the
winner being the candidate who is pairwise preferred over each and every
other candidate. In some elections none of the candidates will win all
of their pairwise comparisons, so there are variations that resolve
these cases. These variations, in alphabetical order, are named the
Condorcet-Kemeny method (or "VoteFair popularity ranking"), the
Condorcet-Schulze (or "beatpath") method, and the Condorcet-Tideman (or
"ranked pairs") method. (The word Condorcet is a French name that is
pronounced "kon-dor-say".)
* Range voting (also known as score voting), which uses score ballots,
and adds together the scores assigned to each candidate, and identifies
the winner as the candidate who receives the highest total score.
There is another voting method that is supported by some, but not most,
of the undersigned election-method experts. It is called "instant-runoff
voting" (or "IRV" or "the alternative vote"), and it uses ranked
ballots. The counting method begins by considering each voter's
highest-ranked choice, and eliminating the candidate with the fewest
votes, and then shifting the affected ballots to the next-most preferred
candidate, and repeating this process until a candidate receives a
majority of votes.
Instant-runoff voting is used in some governmental elections throughout
the world, and most of us agree that usually the results are an
improvement over plurality voting. However, many of us either regard the
degree of improvement as not being significant enough to justify
adopting this method, or are concerned that its not-always-fair results
will be associated with ranked ballots rather than with the
instant-runoff counting method.
Significantly some of the places that have adopted instant-runoff voting
have later rejected the method and returned to plurality voting. These
places include Aspen Colorado and Burlington Vermont in the United
States. The rejections occurred because the method produced clearly
unfair results, in which the winner would not have been the winner if
any of the Condorcet methods had been used.
In addition to the four supported methods listed above, we also support
some combined methods. Specifically we support the use of the Condorcet
method to identify a "Condorcet winner" (who is pairwise-preferred over
all the other candidates) and then, if there is no Condorcet winner, we
support using either instant-runoff voting (IRV) or approval voting to
resolve the ambiguity and identify a single winner.
In the list of signatures we indicate which voting method each signer
most strongly prefers.
Yet most of us also agree that we will support the adoption of any of
the supported methods, namely, in alphabetical order:
* Approval voting
* Bucklin voting
* Any of the Condorcet methods, which are, in alphabetical order:
* Condorcet-Approval
* Condorcet-IRV
* Condorcet-Kemeny
* Condorcet-Schulze
* Condorcet-Tideman
* Range voting
(The choice of counting method determines which kind of ballot is needed.)
The Wikipedia articles about these methods provide detailed descriptions
and characteristics of these methods. In fact, many of us signing this
statement edit these Wikipedia articles to keep them accurate and
unbiased. (The academic names for these methods differ from the
simplified names given here, so the Wikipedia "Voting system" article is
a good starting article.)
If you have specific questions about election methods, many of us
participate in the "Election-Methods" forum (at
http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com),
and we would be happy to answer your questions about any of these
methods. [Note: Can we set up a "redirect" to simplify this URL to
something likewww.electorama.com/election-methods?]
So far, all of the above recommendations apply to filling an executive
(non-legislative) position such as a mayor or governor, where there is a
single "seat" to be filled.
Different considerations apply if an election fills a legislative seat,
such as a seat in a legislature, parliament, or U.S. Congress. In
Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the typical method
for filling a legislative seat is to define a district or riding in
which plurality voting is used to elect one person who is expected to
represent the citizens in that district or riding.
All of us signing this declaration agree that plurality voting is not
acceptable as an election method for filling a single district-based or
riding-based legislative seat.
One way to improve legislative elections is to replace plurality voting
with one of the above-supported election methods, and most of us support
making this improvement.
Most of us agree that a better choice would be to adopt an election
method in which the choice of who wins one seat interacts with who wins
another equivalent seat in ways that ensure that the overall composition
of the legislature at least roughly matches the preferences of the
voters, especially in terms of political-party preferences. However, we
disagree about which election method best serves this purpose.
Most European nations (but not the United Kingdom) use "proportional
representation" to match legislative representatives with the
political-party preferences of the voters. Specifically, when electing
members of parliament (MPs) by this method, voters not only vote for a
candidate, but they also indicate their favorite political party.
Proportional representation then makes adjustments to ensure that the
percentage of legislative seats filled by members of each party roughly
matches the percentage of voters who support each party. In other words,
if 15% of the voters mark the Green Party as their favorite, then
approximately 15% of the parliamentary seats are filled by Green Party
politicians.
Proportional representation methods typically use either "open lists" or
"closed lists" to determine which politicians are selected to fill the
seats that are "won" by a party. The open-list approach allows voters to
express preferences about which candidates they prefer for filling their
party's seats. In the closed-list approach, the political party creates
the ordered list from which their party's seats are filled, and voters
do not participate in influencing the closed list.
Almost all of us agree that where proportional representation is used,
the open-list approach should be used. We oppose the closed-list
approach because it transfers power to people who are not elected, and
who cannot easily be removed from their position of power.
In governments where a single legislative representative is elected from
each district or riding, a political manipulation named "gerrymandering"
is used to influence the positions of district or riding boundaries.
Such boundary manipulations affect which political party is favored to
win the elections in each district or riding, and in turn this affects
the legislative balance of power between political parties. It also
reduces voter turnout because the election results are so difficult to
change through voting.
Unanimously we agree that gerrymandering is unfair. Almost unanimously
we agree that either better voting methods can be used to make the
boundary positions much less influential in the balance of power between
political parties, or that there are fair and impartial ways to choose
the boundaries. However, we do not agree on which such methods are best,
so we are not recommending a specific solution to the gerrymandering
problem.
Overall our highest priority is to stop the use of plurality voting in
elections that involve three or more choices, and to replace plurality
voting with one of the alternative election methods recommended here.
We, as election-method experts, have spent the last decade developing
online resources about election methods, developing software for
numerous election methods, and participating in online discussions to
identify which election methods are worth adopting as replacements for
plurality voting. Now we are sharing our recommendations. We also offer
to share our deep understanding of election methods with policymakers
and politically active citizens of any nation, state, province,
municipality, or political party.
We realize that election-method reforms are unlikely to start with
people in positions of great power because they have made many
sacrifices to achieve their power, and they do not want their efforts to
be undermined.
Therefore we address this statement to you as someone who is aware of
the benefits that election-method reforms will bring.
If you are a policymaker, we strongly urge you to introduce legislation
that would adopt one of the election methods we support. If you are
active in a political party that uses plurality voting, we strongly urge
you to encourage the use of a better voting method to choose your
party's candidates, or to choose your party's internally elected
delegates or representatives. If you are politically active, we strongly
urge you to tell others about the unfairness of plurality voting, and to
bring attention to the fairer election methods supported in this
declaration. If you are a frustrated voter, we strongly urge you to
learn about one or more of the election methods we support, and then
tell others what you have learned. And if you are a member of an
organization that elects officers using plurality voting, we strongly
urge you to advocate using one of the recommended election methods when
an election involves more than two candidates.
We, the following election-method experts, agree with the statements
made in this declaration.
----- End of draft -----
Clarification: I did not use the academic name "preferential ballot" to
refer to ranked ballots because the term "preferential ballot" deserves
to win a prize as the most redundant two-word phrase. (The whole point
of a ballot is to collect preferences!) The alternate name of "1-2-3
ballot" comes from a Canadian who is promoting election-method reform.
Clarification: I did not include the SODA method because it has not yet
been fully peer reviewed, it is not explained in Wikipedia (which
provides further peer reviewing), and it has not been successfully
tested in actual voting situations. Remember that we hope to get this
declaration signed by election-method experts who do not participate in
the Election-Methods forum, and we are recommending these methods for
use in governmental elections where the risk of "trying something new"
is not acceptable.
Perspective: As a reminder, recall that this Election Method forum
started as a spin-off from a general-purpose Elections forum because
these discussions use too much jargon and mathematics for mainstream
participation. By including clear, plain-English explanations of
fundamental election-method concepts in our declaration, we can
re-connect with those people. Also we can connect with the many other
people who advocate election-method reform, but who lack our
election-method expertise. They can use our signed declaration as
ammunition in their battles against plurality voting.
Finally I'll close with a suggested format for signatures (where the
third portion indicates affiliation):
Richard Fobes; Portland, Oregon, USA; VoteFair.org; prefers
Condorcet-Kemeny method
