"Instant Runoff (IRV): monotonicity criterion - Both two-election runoffs and
IRV can fail the monotonicity criterion because voters who shift to this
otherwise winning candidate may shift their votes away from the candidate who
would otherwise be in the runoff, resulting in a different, and stronger
opponent in the final runoff, who may defeat the otherwise winner. Many
election experts dismiss this criterion as having no real world impact (for
more details see www.fairvote.org/monotonicity, and Austen-Smith and Banks
[1998])."
i don't know how you can definitively cite an example of failure, since we
would have to turn back the clock, rerun the election and show that somehow,
the legitimate winner would have won with fewer votes for him/her. what we
*can* show (and this was exactly the case for Burlington 2009) is that if some
voters had, on their way to the polls, changed their mind and changed their
first-choice vote from someone who had lost, to the candidate who had actually
won, that this previously winning candidate will lose (not to the previous
first choice who lost, but to the Condorcet winner who did not make it to the
final IRV round). this is clearly the case in the Burlington 2009 election as
Warren Smith had pointed out in http://rangevoting.org/Burlington.html . how
can FairVote deny non-monotonicity in IRV?
also i found a place where Clay Shentrup (or "CS") also tells us that Range and
Approval do better than Condorcet in electing the Condorcet winner. more "up
is down" and "black is white" logic.
--
r b-j r...@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
-----Original Message-----
From: "robert bristow-johnson" [r...@audioimagination.com]
Date: 10/10/2011 22:57
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Subject: Re: [EM] Critique of FairVote's "approval voting" report
dunno if i can do much critiquing of that particular doc. what i like is in
FairVote's page:
http://www.fairvote.org/single-winner-voting-method-comparison-chart
where they claim that IRV will do a better job getting the Condorcet winner
than does Condorcet (sometimes the Condorcet method will *fail* to elect the
Condorcet winner for those who didn't know that):
"IRV will generally elect a Condorcet winner, ... IRV may actually do a better
job of electing Condorcet winners that nominal Condorcet voting methods,
because of the incentives for strategic voting under Condorcet rules that are
absent under IRV.
...
Condorcet voting is designed specifically to find and elect a Condorcet winner
whenever such a candidate exists. Ironically, due to incentives for strategic
voting inherent in Condorcet methods, they may in fact fail to elect the
Condorcet winner, even when one exists."
i know, so up is down, black is white, etc.
--
r b-j r...@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
-----Original Message-----
From: "Jameson Quinn" [jameson.qu...@gmail.com]
Date: 10/10/2011 18:26
To: "electionsciencefoundation" <electionscie...@googlegroups.com>, "EM"
<election-methods@lists.electorama.com>
Subject: [EM] Critique of FairVote's "approval voting" report
I would like to make a detailed critique of the FairVote report theyve put up
at approvalvoting.blogspot.com and rangevoting.com. I believe that every single
one of the conclusions of that report is dangerously wrong. Ive created a
google doc to help make this critique collaboratively. Please add comments to
the doc to help critique.
Thanks,
Jameson
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
