Hi Juho,
Sorry in advance if I didn't read your message carefully enough, but I think I
probably
did:
--- En date de : Dim 16.10.11, Juho Laatu <juho4...@yahoo.co.uk> a écrit :
Use a Condorcet method to elect the winner among the most approved candidate
pair and those who are at least as approved as the less approved of those two.
- a pair of candidates is approved by a voter if she approves at least one of
those candidates
This method is summable. One should sum up information about pairwise
comparisons, pair approvals and individual approvals.
20: A1 > A2 >>
15: A2 > A1 >>
33: B >> C
32: C >> B
In this example we have three major parties, A, B and C. Or alternatively we
have four parties. In that case parties A1 and A2 are ideologically close to
each others.
This method elects B since pair A1, B (or A2, B) is the most approved pair
(approved by 68 voters), A2 is more approved than B, and B beats both A1 and A2
in pairwise comparison.
Use of approvals typically requires a (sincere) strategy. In this method the
voters should try to impact on which two candidates will be at least as
approved as the most approved pair of candidates. That means that it would make
sense to approve at least one candidate with reasonable chances to be among the
most approved candidates (and not to approve too many of the candidates).
Does this method work well enough? Are this kind of methods useful methods in
general?
I think that your method is similar to my single contest method. I believe you
determine
the critical pair of candidates in exactly the same way. However, while my
method just
has an instant runoff between those two candidates, you are possibly letting in
some
other candidates.
I don't think there is a big problem on paper... It's quite likely that I
tested in my sim
some methods very similar to your proposal, and didn't report on them just
because I
found them to be less than the best.
What I found to be of interest, of course, is that very little strategy
remained on the
ranking side of the method, since its main purpose was to resolve a two-way
race.
Your method will compromise on that a bit...
Do you have majority favorite covered...?
Kevin
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