On Tue, Nov 1, 2011 at 10:53 AM, Jameson Quinn <jameson.qu...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> I would only support using IRV methods of counting after all >> but two (2) candidates were eliminated using Approval Voting. >> Otherwise the vagaries of IRV can pop up. > > You are correct, Kathy, that your process (allowing 3 IRV ranks, eliminating > all but 2 using implicit approval, then having a virtual runoff between the > 2) is actually quite a good system. But from a FairVote perspective, it has > much more of a "problem" with LNH than if you use approval to choose 3 > instead of 2. Jameson, I strongly *oppose* the feature "Later No Harm* in any voting method because it is the feature that prevents the election of any good compromise candidates that the largest number of voters would support. Obviously Condorcet and Approval methods do not have this terrible feature of LNH, which is why I support the Condorcet method. To be clear, I strongly oppose any alternative voting method having the LNH property. -- Kathy Dopp http://electionmathematics.org Town of Colonie, NY 12304 "One of the best ways to keep any conversation civil is to support the discussion with true facts." "Renewable energy is homeland security." Fundamentals of Verifiable Elections http://kathydopp.com/wordpress/?p=174 View some of my research on my SSRN Author page: http://ssrn.com/author=1451051 ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info