David L Wetzell wrote:
http://politeaparty.blogspot.com/2011/11/free-and-fair-elections-and-their.html

They're trying to end the use of IRV in SF.
Obviously, they're concerned about non-monotonicity or that the Condorcet candidate is not guaranteed...

I'm still writing my reply to the long mail, trying to shorten it. But while I'm doing that, I can reply to this, if briefly.

If the IRV-opponents are concerned about non-monotonicity or the lack of Condorcet, neither the page nor the KQED page it links to mentions this. I also hope that you're not implying that non-monotonicity or lack-of-Condorcet objections are somehow disingenuous and that IRV-opponents are all incumbents trying to protect their little domains.

While I don't find it that important, I can see how some could object to the relative opacity of IRV. Plurality has its score (how many top votes each candidate got), Range has mean score, and Minmax has the magnitude of the worst defeat (where lesser is better). What does IRV have? It has the round in which the candidate was eliminated, but that doesn't, by itself, say anything about whether it was a squeaker or the candidate was a sure loser.

(In a sense, this ties in with the sensitivity to initial conditions of IRV. You might say "B lost in the second round, and the guy that was next to last in the second round only survived by a single vote, so that was close". But perhaps B would have led someone else (D instead of E) to win, had he survived -- or perhaps defeating C instead of being defeated by C would only have made B lose soundly in a later round?)

I think that if IRV3/AV3 were used instead, it would be easier to explain the vote-counting method to folks.

    I think it'd be easier if a two stage approach were used. Like
before, let folks rank up to three candidates.
    Then, in the first stage, count up the number of times each
    candidate gets ranked by voter(if voters ranked the same candidate
    more than once, it would only count once). Publish these results on
    election night. Make the three candidates who get ranked most often
be the finalists.
    Then, for the second stage, use an instant runoff vote. First, tally
    the number of times the three finalists are the favorite of voters.
    If one is preferred by a majority of voters then (s)he is the
    winner. Otherwise, eliminate the candidate who is preferred by the
    fewest voters and transfer her/his votes as much as possible to the
    other two candidates. Then, after tallying the votes for the two
finalists, the one with the most votes wins.
    Does that sound simple enuf, D.Eris? It could be done in two days
    time, most of the time...
    dlw


The real issue that prevents electoral reform in the US is marketing, not electoral analytics. Electoral analytics, as illustrated by this board, are very good at exposing attempts to pass bad election reforms for the wrong reasons. But I don't think it works in creating a working consensus on which electoral reforms to push for among activists. This is illustrated by how your own "consensus" statement recommends 4 alternatives to FPTP and waves its hands over IRV. It also says nothing about the pragmatic use of PR to make "more local" elections become competitive, to handicap the cut-throat rivalry between the two major parties and to make them both more attentive to the issues of minority groups.

It says nothing about the use of PR in a local setting to handicap rivalry between the two major parties because we don't know that it will do so enough to matter. More generally, it doesn't mention PR as it can't cover too wide an area - there was an earlier objection that the declaration was already too long.

(I do like PR, but I can see that logic.)

So how about it? Can we try to rewrite the consensus statement to include an endorsement of IRV3/AV3 and to make it more marketable to #OWS and other folks?

If you think the statement is too dilute as it is, then wouldn't adding another method make it less forceful still?

You could, as Richard points out, sign the statement and then say you support IRV3/AV3 as an improvement upon IRV. If you want to see Plurality gone, and think the main proposed alternatives would work, why not?

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