I honestly don't understand your hostility to me. Can you explain it? 2011/11/29 MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkk...@hotmail.com>
> > Jameson-- > > You had said: > > Majority > Judgment has similar advantages to MTA in this case. > > [endquote] > > I asked: > > Does it? Who knows? > > You replied: > > Anyone who takes the time to read the academic > literature<https://sites.google.com/site/ridalaraki/majority-judgment> > . > > [endquote] > > Translation: You yourself don't know the answer. > > MJ's advocates are peculiarly reticent about its specific properties, > advantages and criterion-compliances. > > Alright, I'll answer it for you. MJ does not have advantages similiar to > those of MTA. > > > > Have its proponents told what criteria it meets and specifically what > guarantees it > offers? > > How does it do in the Approval bad-example? > > > You answered: > > Same as MTA. > > [endquote] > > Ok, in other words, MJ doesn't pass in the ABE. Thank you. > > You continued: > > That is, honest-votes will reliably give a good result, unlike unstable > Approval; but strategic voting will lead to failure. > > [endquote] > > Nonsense. That's a remarkably naive statement. In every nonprobabilistic > method, strategy is advantageous. > Sorry, you misunderstood me. I meant that strategic voting would be advantageous for the voters, and thus would lead to the method failing the ABE/Chicken Dilemma. > > So you think that you've found one for which that isn't so? :-) > No. Actually, it seems to me that you think I'm an idiot and/or an enemy of yours and so you interpret everything I say in the most uncharitable possible way. I hope I'm wrong about that impression, because I am neither of those things. > > > > > (to compare it to MTAOC) > > > If you're unwilling to research the published answers to your own > questions, why do you persist in asking us to look up your alphabet soup in > old posts? For instance, I know what you mean by MTAOC (a system with a > strong dishonest-fill incentive > > [endquote] > > In MTAOC, your middle rating of a lesser-evil (B) can't help the > lesser-evil beat your favorite (A). And the B-favorite voters reciprocate > that middle rating, then it's more likely that one or the > other of those 2 candidates will win, instead of someone (C) less-liked by > both factions. If it looks as if that would elect A, then the B voters > don't benefit from middle-rating A > unless they sincerely prefer A to C. Likewise if A and B are reversed in > that sentence. > All that is true. And has nothing to do with the problem I pointed out. The method has a strong dishonest-fill incentive. A Gore>Bush>Nader voter could in some circumstances elect Gore only by strategically voting Gore>Nader; but if Nader had slightly higher-than-expected support, then that dishonest strategy could lead Nader to win even with as little as 25% honest support. > > You continued: > > , but searching past messages for that acronym just gives the written-out > name > > [endquote] > > No, each method's definition was announced in a post whose subject line > contained the name of that method, written out, > and, in nearly every case, with the abbreviation in parentheses. > > False. > > > What majority-rule guarantees does it offer? Does it meet 3P or 1CM? > > > You replied: > > It meets 3P, which I happen to remember what it means. > > [endquote] > > The 3P complying methods that I'm aware of all make two special > distinctions, usually a distinction between top rating vs rating below top; > and between rating vs not > rating. MJ makes no such distinctions. So, if it meets 3P, then what are > the two protection-levels required for 3P compliance? > Yes it does. Every single rating level in MJ is a "protection level" for 3-level-protection. > > You continued: > > If you define 1CM <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/1CM> I'll tell you if > it meets that. > > [endquote] > > Oh, that's ok. _I'll_ tell _you_: It doesn't. For the reasons stated in > my paragraph above. > You just told me nothing more than if I told you that it meets QWERT or that it doesn't meet ZXCVB. I suspect that your 1CM is actually a pernicious criterion that it's better not to pass, but since you prefer to make unreliable assertions about what methods pass it than actually re-posting or linking the definition, I'm not going to bother checking. > > As I said, I've been meaning to post my definitions in the wikipedia. > Lately I haven't had a lot of time for computer. But I'm soon > going to post those definitions. > > Ok, it doesn't pass in the ABE, and it doesn't pass 3P or 1CM. Well, if we > defined a 2P (as compared to 3P), it would pass that, as would Approval > and RV. Maybe there should be a 2P criterion. It probably passes WDSC too, > and probably FBC. > > > > It probably has a strategy situation very much like that of ordinary RV. > The method of summed scores. > > > You replied: > > No. For most voters in real-world studies of MJ, their honest, > not-even-normalized MJ ballot was strategically optimal. That is clearly > far better than Range. > > [endquote] > > Oh, that's different! In MJ, some voters don't have incentive to rate > other than sincerely :-) > > And the strategizing voters won't affect the outcome? > Remember, this discussion started when I said MJ was comparable to MTA. You think you've refuted that by pointing out that MJ doesn't violate the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem? > > By the way, if you're going to advocate MJ, it needs a better name. > Majority Judgement might be ok as a promotional name, but it is not a > descriptive name. > How about (the obvious) "Cardinal Median" or "Median Cardinal". > A good name allows people to find out what a method means. It is far more reliable to use wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Majority_Judgment>or the library <http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?ttype=2&tid=12522>for that, than just interpolating based on a descriptive name. Jameson
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