Forest--
Let's find out what its properties are.
Just preliminarily, it sounds like one of the MMT ideas that I considered.
But it seemed to me, at the time (if it's the same method I was considering)
that, if a ballot can be counted in that majority merely by rating each
candidate
in the set equal to or over every candidate outside the set, then, in the ABE,
the B votes could
rate A at bottom, with C, and still be part of the relevant majority. So there
there is
the set required by the acquiescing rule, and there is one candidate rated
above bottom
by everyone in that set: Candidate B.
So, the method that I'd considered wouldn't pass in the ABE. I don't know if
the method
you describe is the same one, but, preliminarily, it sounds similar.
But maybe not. Any possibility could yield improvement.
My definition of that set was something like this:
A set of candidates rated equal to or over everyone outside the set by each
member of the
same majority of the voters.
Mike Ossipoff
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