Mike wrote .. > > MMPO with symmetric completion at bottom, while avoiding Kevin's > > bad-example, also sometimes loses > > MMPO's ABE-success: > > > > 60: A>B > > 55: B > > 100: C > Forest replied
> Here is the pairwise opposition matrix for MAMD: > > [[155, 110, 87.5], > [105, 100, 115], > [127.5, 100, 115]] . > > The max dissent against B is from the 110 A supporters. This is > the minimum of > the max dissents, since A has is disapproved by 155, and B has a > complaint of > 115 against C , not to mention the 115 disapproval against C. > > So yes, B wins. > Of course, if the A faction knows that the B faction sincere order is B>A>C, the 60 A>B voters can split up to give 15 A 45 A>B Then if the B voters stubbornly bullet, C will win. But if as many (45) of them vote sincerely as the A voters, then A will win. I think this is a pretty good resolution of the defection problem. ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info