On 21 Dec 2011 I proposed this criterion:
*The winner must come from the smallest set S of candidates about which
the following is true: the number of ballots on which all the members
(or sole member) is voted strictly above all the non-member candidates
is greater than the number of ballots on which a (any) non-member
candidate is voted strictly above all the members of S.*
That is fairly clear, but the wording could perhaps be improved, say:
*If the number of ballots on which some set S of candidates is voted
strictly above all the candidates outside S is greater than the number
of ballots on which all the members of S are voted below equal-top
(i.e. strictly below some/any outside-S candidate), then the winner must
come from S.*
I tentatively suggested the name "Add-Top Proofed Solid Coalition
Majority". A bit less clumsy would be "Add-Top Proofed Mutual
Majority". Maybe there is a better name that either does without the
word "Majority" or includes another word that qualifies it. For the
time being I'll stick with Add-Top Proofed Mutual Majority (ATPMM)
I gave this example:
45: A>B
20: A=B
32: B
03: D
My criterion says that the winner must be A, but Mike Ossipoff's MTA
method elects B.
I did endorse MTA as an improvement on MCA, but since it (and not MCA)
fails this (what I consider to be very important) criterion (and is also
a bit more complicated than MCA) I now withdraw
that endorsement. I still acknowledge that MTA may be a bit more
"strategically comfortable" for voters, but I can't give that factor
enough weight to make MTA acceptable or win its comparison with MCA.
Chris Benham
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